





Working Paper No. 359 
 
 
Public Discourse and  


















University of Zurich 
 




Working Paper Series 
  
ISSN 1664-7041 (print) 














Public Discourse and Socially Responsible Market Behavior* 
 
Björn Bartling Vanessa Valero Roberto A. Weber Lan Yao 
 
August 18, 2020 
 
We investigate the causal impact of public discourse on socially responsible 
market behavior. We conduct laboratory market experiments with products that 
differ in their production costs and social impact, and provide market actors and 
impacted third parties with the opportunity to discuss appropriate market 
behavior. Across two studies that vary characteristics of the discourse, the 
external impact and the participants, we find that public discourse substantially 
increases market social responsibility. Our findings suggest that discussions and 
campaigns focusing on appropriate market behavior can be powerful tools for 
shaping responsible norms governing market conduct and addressing 
inefficiencies due to market failures. 
 
JEL Classification: C92, D62, D83, M14  
Keywords: Public discourse, market failure, externalities, social responsibility, 
social norms, experiment, communication   
                                                      
* Bartling/Weber: Department of Economics, University of Zurich, Blümlisalpstrasse 10, 8006 Zurich, Switzerland; 
Valero: School of Business and Economics, Loughborough University; Yao: Shanghai University of Finance and 
Economics. We are grateful for support from the Swiss National Science Foundation (grant number 100018_165943) 
and for helpful comments from Ernst Fehr, Roland Bénabou, Florian Schneider and participants at several seminars 
and conferences.  
 2 
1. Introduction 
The production, exchange and consumption of a good can create negative impacts on parties 
uninvolved in the market transaction. For example, markets for fossil fuels, weapons and animal-
based products are often highlighted as instances where exchange between parties that benefit from 
a transaction can have substantial detrimental impacts on others. Standard prescriptions for such 
problems—such as bans or taxation—are sometimes infeasible due to the complexity of 
determining optimal policy and political inertia. As an alternative remedy, there are many calls for 
market actors, including firms and consumers, to exhibit social responsibility and voluntarily 
internalize the externalities generated by their market activities (Bénabou and Tirole, 2010). 
However, the mechanisms through which consumers and firms can actually be encouraged to incur 
greater personal costs in order to benefit others remains in need of better understanding.  
One possible channel for fostering socially responsible behavior is through public 
discourse and campaigns. By highlighting the harmful societal impacts of specific forms of market 
exchange and drawing attention to the actions that may mitigate such harm, individuals’ 
perceptions of appropriate conduct and the social norms governing market exchange might be 
altered to encourage greater social responsibility. For example, the “Fridays for Future” movement 
aims to stimulate discussions regarding the negative environmental impacts of carbon emissions 
and encourages consumers, firms and policymakers to change their behavior.1 Responsible 
consumption in pursuit of climate change mitigation is also widely discussed in the media, on 
university campuses and in policy forums. For example, the World Economic Forum dedicates a 
substantial amount of its activities to discussions and publications on the topic of how firms and 
consumers can take actions to mitigate climate change.2 Other large public campaigns advocate 
voluntary avoidance of single-use plastics, fur, pesticides and animal testing. However, whether 
such campaigns have any impact on the behavior of market participants remains unexplored. A 
better understanding of whether public discourse can affect socially responsible market behavior 
and improve societal outcomes is thus necessary. 
In this paper, we report two laboratory studies that explore the causal effect of public 
discourse on market social responsibility. Both of our studies involve stylized product markets in 
which products that vary in their social impact are traded between market participants in the roles 
                                                      
1 See https://fridaysforfuture.org/ (accessed on August 4, 2020) 
2 See https://www.weforum.org/agenda/archive/climate-change (accessed on August 4, 2020). 
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of buyers and sellers. In our first experiment, the external impact of market exchange falls on 
subjects in the role of passive third parties, while in our second experiment the impact is on 
donations to a charity with the objective of mitigating climate change and reducing poverty. In 
both experiments, sellers and buyers can exchange either a harmful type of product that costs less 
to produce but creates external harm or a responsible product that involves a higher production 
cost but imposes no external harm. We thus measure market social responsibility by the extent to 
which market actors exchange the responsible product type.  
Our experimental manipulations focus on the impact of public discourse—an opportunity 
for people involved with and impacted by the market to engage in communication. In all cases, 
this discourse consists of a single 8-minute electronic chat in which participants can repeatedly 
send messages to all other participants involved in the communication. Our interest is in how this 
discourse leads to norms and agreements regarding the “correct” thing to do in the market and 
influences the prevalence of socially responsible exchange.  
While a considerable body of experimental research—which we review in the next 
section—documents that communication generally increases pro-social behavior and efficiency, 
this literature typically studies instances in which the agreements reached and norms developed 
benefit all communicating parties and yield Pareto improvements. In our case, by contrast, and in 
the contexts of most public discourse about limiting the harm from market activity, people who 
advocate for socially responsible market behavior in public discourse are often promoting actions 
that are personally costly in monetary terms rather than beneficial. Therefore, it is an open question 
whether communication is an effective means in such contexts to mitigate social harm, or if self-
serving arguments that can arise in such discussions may actually reduce social concern. 
In our first study, in which the external impact falls on other, passive study participants in 
the role of third parties, our treatments vary who participates in the discourse and what the 
participants know about their role in the market at the time of engaging in discourse. Our first 
condition, Veil, represents an idealized form of communication in which everyone—buyers, sellers 
and third parties—participates in the discourse and in which all participants are unaware of their 
role in the market at the point in time when discourse occurs. Given that all participants are equally 
likely ex ante to be in the role of third parties, concerns based on self-interest, efficiency and 
fairness coincide and we expect discourse to highlight “responsibilizing narratives” that advocate 
for socially responsible behavior by market actors (Bénabou et al., 2019). While such a Rawlsian 
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“veil of ignorance” is unrealistic outside the laboratory, this condition represents a potential upper 
bound for the effects of discourse on socially responsible market behavior and the kind of influence 
we might expect if individuals could put aside their personal interests at the critical point at which 
they develop norms regarding appropriate behavior.  
Our second condition, No Veil, implements one change by informing participants of their 
role in the market prior to their engaging in discourse. This represents a more realistic case and, 
correspondingly, we expect a reduction in the degree of socially responsible behavior. Thus, we 
test whether the availability of self-interested perspectives concurrent with public discourse 
changes how such discourse affects behavior and norms governing market conduct. 
Our third condition, Exclusive, restricts communication only to the buyers and sellers, who 
are aware of their roles as in No Veil, omitting the third parties impacted by the externality. 
Discussions of how to engage in more socially responsible market behavior often occur between 
members of high-income countries and involve firms and consumers whose conduct creates the 
externalities—e.g., at the World Economic Forum—with less participation from those people who 
bear the external costs, such as people in low-income countries. This condition allows us to 
investigate the importance of participation in discourse by those impacted by negative 
externalities. Excluding such perspectives and arguments may decrease empathy toward the harm 
imposed on third parties (Andreoni and Rao, 2011) and may allow market participants to more 
easily develop “absolving narratives,” or self-serving justifications for trading the more harmful 
and less costly product type (Bénabou et al., 2019). Therefore, we expect the elimination of those 
harmed by the externality from public discourse to further reduce social responsibility. 
Finally, to investigate whether public discourse serves as a complement to or substitute for 
existing concerns for social impact, we study the impact of discourse in two populations where 
earlier work found different levels of baseline market social responsibility. In Bartling et al. (2015), 
market experiments conducted in Switzerland demonstrated substantially higher market shares for 
the responsible product than identical experiments conducted in China. Public discourse might be 
complementary to baseline social concern if a sufficient number of socially responsible individuals 
are needed to promote arguments in support of reducing negative externalities in order to effect 
change in the remaining market participants. In contrast, public discourse might be a substitute for 
baseline social concern if the pre-existing high levels of such concern, as in Switzerland, reflect 
widespread norms regarding appropriate social conduct, leaving little room to further strengthen 
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such norms. Therefore, we test whether the impact of discourse differs between the two locations 
to provide evidence on the importance of existing norms of market conduct. 
The results of our first study are striking. First, public discourse in the Veil condition has 
very large, positive and sustained effects on market social responsibility. In Switzerland, discourse 
essentially yields almost universal exchange of the responsible product, compared to a market 
share of about 50 percent in a Baseline condition absent public discourse. Perhaps even more 
interesting, eliminating the veil of ignorance or excluding third parties from the discourse reduces 
the impact of discourse on the market share for the responsible product only moderately, if at all. 
Thus, we find that even a one-time instance of public discourse regarding appropriate market 
behavior can have profound and persistent impacts on the manifestation of market social 
responsibility. Using an incentivized norm elicitation method (Krupka and Weber, 2013), we also 
observe that this impact leads to stronger prescriptive norms regarding the inappropriateness of 
exchanging the harmful product.  
Turning to the interaction between pre-existing levels of social concern and public 
discourse, we first closely replicate the observation in Bartling et al. (2015) of a lower baseline 
market share for the responsible product in China than in Switzerland. We interpret this as 
reflecting weaker prescriptive social norms regarding trade of the socially responsible product in 
China, which our social norm measurement confirms. However, the positive effects of public 
discourse on market social responsibility are generally similar between the two populations. For 
example, the market share of the responsible product increases by roughly 50 percentage points 
from the Baseline to the Veil condition in both populations. Our findings thus suggest that the 
effects of public discourse are neither substitutes nor complements, but rather independent of the 
baseline level of norms governing market conduct. 
Our second study is substantively similar but changes two important features. First, we 
investigate whether discourse has similarly positive effects when the impacts of market exchange 
are not borne by other similar participants in the laboratory. The laboratory may be an environment 
in which high levels of social proximity and strong norms of equality make arguments about 
showing concern for impacts on other laboratory subjects quite strong. In non-laboratory markets, 
however, negative externalities typically involve more complex consequences that are more 
socially and psychologically distant. To investigate whether a less laboratory-centered external 
impact reduces the positive influence of discourse on market social responsibility, we change the 
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target of the externality to a charity that works to mitigate climate change and economic inequality 
by employing farmers in low-income countries to plant trees. Aside from being a more complex 
and distant influence, using a charity of this kind also creates the possibility that laboratory 
participants can more easily come up with arguments during discourse for why the charity may be 
ineffective or undeserving (see Exley, 2020). Despite the substantial design change, our first two 
conditions, Baseline (Charity) and Exclusive (Charity), essentially replicate the results from the 
Baseline and Exclusive conditions (since the charity is absent from the discourse) in our first study.  
The second change in Study 2 deals with the timing of the public discourse. In all of our 
other conditions, discourse occurs at the beginning of the experiment, before participants have had 
an opportunity to engage in market exchange. However, many situations of interest, like climate 
change, involve contexts in which market behavior already exists and produces negative external 
impacts. Therefore, it is plausible that increasing social responsibility may be more difficult in 
such contexts, where historical practices may create greater inertia and a desire to advance 
arguments in support of existing conduct. Our Experienced (Charity) condition therefore 
introduces discourse only after several rounds of the baseline market activity. We find that the 
positive impact of public discourse is similar, irrespective of whether discourse occurs before the 
market activity, as in Exclusive (Charity), or after participants have experience in trading, as in 
Experienced (Charity). Thus, our second study reproduces the main substantive finding from our 
first study and demonstrates the finding’s robustness to situations designed to make the positive 
impacts of discourse more challenging. 
To summarize, across two studies and a total of eight comparisons, we find that a simple 
form of public discourse greatly increases socially responsible market behavior and strengthens 
the corresponding norms governing market conduct. Our results are important, as they suggest that 
there is room for these kinds of campaigns and initiatives as a policy tool for promoting efficiency 
and avoiding negative externalities imposed on third parties. Our results also address the literature 
on the positive social impacts of communication. In particular, we provide, to our knowledge, the 
first evidence that allowing people to communicate leads to agreements on behavior that yield 
higher social surplus in markets, despite the fact that such behaviors are costly to the people 
engaging in communication. 
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews related work. Section 3 
presents the experimental design and results of Study 1, while Section 4 contains Study 2. Section 
5 presents a combined analysis of the content of discourse from both studies. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Related Literature 
Our research closely relates to a growing body of work that investigates the conditions under which 
individuals choose to voluntarily internalize the external impacts of their market activity (Rode et 
al., 2008; Bénabou and Tirole, 2010; Dufwenberg et al., 2011; Bartling et al., 2015, 2019, 2020; 
Hainmueller et al. 2015; Kirchler et al., 2015; Pigors and Rockenbach, 2016; Irlenbusch and 
Saxler, 2019; Danz et al., 2020; Ockenfels et al. 2020; Sutter et al., 2020). As with our work, much 
of this research uses laboratory experiments, which have the advantage of allowing tight control 
of the market environment and the establishment of causal relationships. While questions about 
external validity always need to be carefully considered, recent work indicates that preferences for 
more socially responsible products in the laboratory predict willingness to pay more for such 
products in real product markets (Engelmann et al., 2018). Our work is novel to this literature, 
since no earlier papers study the effects of communication and discourse on socially responsible 
market behavior. 
Perhaps even closer to our work, numerous studies demonstrate that communication can 
be efficiency enhancing in other domains of social behavior, such as in social dilemmas (Dawes 
et al., 1977; Isaac and Walker, 1988; Ostrom et al., 1992; Bochet et al., 2006), in coordination 
games (Cooper et al., 1992; Blume and Ortmann, 2007; Brandts and Cooper, 2007; Kriss et al., 
2016) and under incomplete contracting (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Kessler and Leider, 
2012; Krupka et al., 2017). In all these papers, providing individuals with the opportunity to 
communicate generally means that they act more cooperatively or coordinate their actions better, 
making all communicating parties better off. While this suggests that we may similarly observe 
more efficient outcomes with fewer externality-producing products when we introduce discourse 
in our market experiments, there is an important distinction. In our experiment, discourse only 
improves efficiency if it convinces buyers and sellers to incur greater personal monetary costs to 
benefit others impacted by their market behavior—participants in the role of third parties (Study 
1) or a charity (Study 2). Thus, relative to the above work, our study is unique in investigating 
whether communication can lead to more pro-social, but personally monetarily costly, actions. 
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Only one other paper experimentally investigates how communication affects decision 
making in contexts where efficiency involves lower earnings for decision makers. Ellman and 
Pezanis-Christou (2010) study two-person laboratory firms with varying hierarchical structures, 
where production entails a bad that generates profits for the firm but harms a third party. Their 
treatments manipulate communication between a manager and a subordinate. They find that 
communication has a positive impact on socially responsible behavior, lowering the negative 
externality, but only under a vertical structure in which the manager decides on a production level 
and the employee can decide whether to implement this action or quit. Thus, the findings suggest 
that communication can facilitate greater pro-social concerns toward outsiders. However, the 
extent to which such an effect would survive in a market context, involving many other 
participants, with repeated interactions and diffused responsibility, is unclear. Bartling et al. (2015) 
find that pro-social behavior in market contexts differs from similar behavior framed as a non-
market interaction, which suggests that findings generated in non-market contexts might not 
necessarily translate into market contexts.  
A separate line of research studies how communication influences distributional outcomes, 
as in dictator or bargaining games. For instance, Agranov and Tergiman (2014) study 
communication in a Baron-Ferejohn bargaining context, where one individual makes a proposal 
regarding how to divide a fixed pie and a majority of committee members have to approve the 
proposal for it to be implemented. Communication produces proposals closer to the theoretical 
prediction of minimum-winning coalitions that typically reward coalition members and exclude 
others entirely, suggesting that communication can be employed to produce more favorable 
outcomes for a few, at the expense of others with less strategic power. In our experiments, this 
suggests that discourse may lead to outcomes that advantage the buyers and sellers at the expense 
of the third parties, which is clearly inconsistent with our data.  
In other related work, Andreoni and Rao (2011) study communication in dictator games, 
finding that the presence and nature of communication has strong impacts on one-sided sharing. 
Specifically, when only the recipient or both the dictator and the recipient can send messages, 
giving increases; but when only the dictator can send messages, the amount shared decreases. 
Andreoni and Rao interpret these effects as resulting from communication from the recipient 
increasing empathy, but communication only from the dictator providing excuses or 
rationalizations for sharing less. In our experiments, this suggests that excluding those impacted 
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by the externality from discourse may decrease social responsibility, perhaps even to levels below 
those in the no-communication baseline, which is not supported by our data. While we find that 
the positive impact of discourse sometimes decreases when impacted third parties are excluded 
from discourse, the difference is not consistently statistically significant. Moreover, we find that 
socially responsible behavior is more prevalent, relative to the no communication baseline, even 
when impacted third parties are excluded from discourse.  
3. Study 1 
We implement an experimental product market in which subjects in the roles of sellers and buyers 
can trade two types of products. One product type generates a negative externality for third parties 
but has a low cost of production. The other type has a higher production cost but does not impose 
any social harm. Our main interest is the market share of the latter, socially responsible, product 
type. We give participants in some treatments the opportunity to discuss appropriate market 
behavior before they start interacting in the market, which allows us to study the impact of public 
discourse on social responsibility. We study two distinct subject pools, a student sample from 
Zurich, Switzerland and a student sample from Shanghai, China.  
3.1 Experimental Design 
3.1.1 Market Game 
A market comprises 16 participants: six firms, five consumers and five third parties. Roles are 
randomly assigned and remain fixed throughout the experiment.  
Markets are repeated for 24 periods. At the beginning of a period, each subject receives an 
initial endowment of 100 points. Firms and consumers can earn additional points from their market 
transactions. Two types of products exist that differ only in their negative impact on the third 
parties and their production cost. One product type—which we refer to as the “fair product”—is 
socially responsible, meaning that it does not produce a negative externality, but costs 10 to 
produce. The other product type—the “harmful product”—creates a negative externality of 60 for 
third parties, but costs nothing to produce. Both products have a value of 50 to a consumer, 
meaning that the two product types differ only in their social impact. 
 In each period, firms simultaneously select product types and prices (between 0 and 50) in 
a posted-offer market. Once all firms make their decisions, the resulting offers are publicly 
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revealed to all consumers.3 Consumers enter the market sequentially in an order that is randomly 
determined in each period and decide whether to buy at most one product. Consumers thus observe 
a menu of up to six product offers, each consisting of a price and a product type. Each firm earns, 
in case its offered product is sold, the difference between the posted price and the production cost. 
Each consumer earns, if he or she decides to buy a product, the difference between the product’s 
value of 50 and the price paid.  
Third parties can neither sell nor buy, but they can incur losses depending on the types of 
products exchanged. In every period, third parties and consumers are randomly matched into pairs. 
If a consumer purchases a harmful product, then the randomly matched third party incurs a loss of 
60. If the consumer purchases a fair product or does not purchase any product, then the randomly 
matched third party does not incur a loss. 
The extent to which the market produces the fair product is a reflection of the degree of 
social responsibility exhibited by firms and consumers. We use the market share of the fair product 
as our primary measure of social responsibility. 
3.1.2 Treatments 
In our Baseline condition, there is no discourse prior to engaging in the market activity. Subjects 
directly proceed to the market game after learning their roles as firm, consumer or third party.  
We implement three treatment conditions that include public discourse. These add an 8-
minute interval during which subjects have the opportunity to communicate via an electronic chat 
window. We provide guidance for the public discourse by asking subjects to discuss how “socially 
acceptable” or “socially inacceptable” it is to trade the product with negative impact on third 
parties and to what extent trading this product is consistent or inconsistent with what most people 
agree is the “appropriate,” “right” or “moral” thing to do. The messages are not restricted, other 
than proscribing personally identifying, obscene or insulting statements.  
Table 1 provides an overview of our treatments. In the Veil condition, subjects engage in 
public discourse prior to learning their roles as firms, consumers or third parties. That is, subjects 
in this condition discuss the appropriateness and moral acceptability of exchanging a product with 
negative impact on third parties behind a Rawlsian “veil of ignorance.” In contrast, in the No Veil 
                                                      
3 We eliminate the possibility of cross-period reputation by not showing subjects the identification numbers of other 
market participants and by randomly ordering the display of product offers in each period. 
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condition, we inform subjects of their roles prior to engaging in the public discourse. Apart from 
the timing of information about subjects’ roles, the Veil and No Veil conditions are identical.4 
Finally, in the Exclusive condition, we inform subjects of their roles prior to engaging in the public 
discourse, as in No Veil. But in contrast to No Veil, only firms and consumers participate in the 
discourse in the Exclusive condition. This feature prevents third parties from communicating their 
concerns and recommendations regarding market behavior.5  
 
Table 1: Overview of Experimental Conditions 
 Baseline Veil No Veil Exclusive 
t=1 ̶ Public discourse (all roles) ̶ ̶ 
t=2 Subjects learn their roles: firm, consumer or third party  
t=3 ̶ ̶ Public discourse (all roles) 
Public discourse 
(excl. third parties) 
t=4 Subjects participate in the market for 24 periods 
3.1.3 Social Norm Elicitation 
In all treatments, we elicit social norms at the end of the market, using the elicitation method 
developed by Krupka and Weber (2013). We use this task to elicit participants’ ratings of the social 
appropriateness of trading the harmful product. Subjects can choose from four possible responses: 
“highly socially acceptable,” “somewhat socially acceptable,” “somewhat socially inacceptable,” 
and “highly socially inacceptable,” to describe such behavior. Subjects’ responses are incentivized: 
each participant earns additional money (CHF 10 in Switzerland or CNY 10 in China) if that 
subject’s response corresponds to the most frequently chosen answer provided by the other 
subjects in a session. 
  
                                                      
4 Subjects can refer to each other during the chat through fixed ID numbers. Messages are preceded by identifiers 
ranging from 1-16 in Veil and by letter-number combinations (e.g., “S1” through “S6” for sellers) that also identify 
roles in No Veil. However, they cannot subsequently match messages to individual market behavior. 
5 We also give the third parties the possibility to discuss among themselves in order to engage all subjects during the 
eight minutes of public discourse. All subjects are aware of this design feature. However, the discourse among the 
third parties cannot directly affect the market outcome because third parties are passive players.  
 12 
3.1.4 Procedures   
We conducted the study at the University of Zurich and the Shanghai University of Finance and 
Economics. We collected eight markets per treatment, both in Switzerland and in China, with each 
market consisting of 16 participants (six sellers, five buyers and five third parties). A total of 1,024 
subjects participated in the above four experimental conditions, half of them in Switzerland and 
half of them in China. We implemented the experiment using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). When 
entering the lab, subjects received written instructions and had to answer control questions to 
ensure understanding of the market activity.6  
Experimental points in the market game were converted into money at the rate of 10 points 
to CHF 2.50 in Switzerland and CNY 4 in China. The relative conversion rates aim at matching 
the purchasing power of experimental points in both countries. One period was randomly chosen 
for payment at the end of a session. On average, subjects in China earned about CNY 62, including 
a show-up fee of CNY 15; subjects in Switzerland earned about CHF 41, including a show-up fee 
of CHF 15. Sessions lasted about two hours, on average. 
3.2 Hypotheses 
We assume that individuals not only care about their earnings in the market but also—to different 
degrees—about the negative externalities generated by the market activity. The more the 
individuals care about the social impact of their market activity, i.e., the higher their levels of social 
responsibility, the higher the market share of the fair product. For example, such concern can be 
captured by a representative utility function of the form, 𝑢𝑢 = 𝜋𝜋(𝑥𝑥) − 𝜃𝜃 𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑥), where the first term 
on the right hand side corresponds to an individual’s pecuniary payoff from exchanging product 𝑥𝑥 
and the second term represents the potential disutility from exchanging a product that produces 
social harm, 𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑥). The term, 𝜃𝜃, captures the weight individuals place on the externality. The higher 
this weight in a population, the larger the market share of the fair product. Bartling, et al. (2015) 
find that a simple utility function of this type captures behavior in the market experiment quite 
well and estimate 𝜃𝜃 > 0 across several experimental treatments.  
                                                      
6 To ensure comparability between the two sets of instructions, we employed a back-translation procedure in writing 
the Mandarin version of the instructions—one person translated the English instructions into Mandarin and another 
person translated them back into English to identify and reconcile inconsistencies. The English version of the 
instructions for Study 1 is in Appendix F. 
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Extending this approach to our experiment, let the weight placed on the externality be given 
by 𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡). The first argument, 𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠 ≥ 0, denotes the pre-existing (or intrinsic) level of social 
concern that prevails in a society, with 𝑠𝑠 = {Switzerland,  China} in our study. The second 
argument, 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡, captures how the weight depends on the type of public discourse, with 𝑡𝑡 =
{∅, Veil,  No Veil,  Exclusive}. 𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑∅) thus denotes the weight placed on negative externalities 
in a given society in the absence of any opportunities to engage in public discourse, as in our 
Baseline condition.  
We first compare the market share of the fair product in Baseline and Veil. We expect that 
engaging in discourse behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance when subjects know that they might be 
in the role of a third party will increase concern for social impact by highlighting arguments for 
efficiency and by enhancing empathy for the third parties. Our hypothesis H1 captures that we 
expect a positive effect of discourse on the weight placed on the negative externality in Veil, and 
thus a higher market share of the fair product, relative to Baseline. 
H1: 𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉) > 𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑∅) 
Our second set of hypotheses deal with the impact of discourse on social concern as we 
add more realistic features to the discourse. First, people are typically aware of their roles in 
society. When buyers and sellers know their roles—as beneficiaries of low-cost production—we 
expect that they will be less inclined to generate and less easily swayed by appeals to social 
responsibility. This is captured in our hypothesis H2a. Second, public discourse in high-income 
countries often involves consumers and producers from such countries but omits those individuals 
in other, often low-income, countries affected by the externalities. We expect that eliminating 
participation in discourse by those impacted by externalities will further diminish the extent to 
which public discourse enhances concerns for efficiency and empathy. This is captured in our 
hypothesis H2b. 
H2a: 𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑Veil) > 𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑No Veil) 
H2b: 𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑No Veil) > 𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑Exclusive) 
Note that we do not provide hypotheses for comparisons of our Baseline condition with 
either No Veil or Exclusive, because the results could go either way. For instance, public discourse 
in No Veil may enhance concern for social impact through similar channels as in Veil—by 
promoting concerns for efficiency or empathy for third parties. However, market participants may 
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also use the communication opportunity to generate self-serving justifications for benefitting by 
trading the socially harmful product. Thus, the net effect could possibly yield higher or lower 
levels of social responsibility in No Veil compared to Baseline. Moreover, even if concern for 
social impact is higher in No Veil than in Baseline, whether concern for social impact remains 
higher in Exclusive, once third parties are excluded from discourse, is not clear a priori. While we 
refrain from stating directional hypotheses, we will study how market shares of the fair product in 
Baseline compare with those in both No Veil and Exclusive, as an exploratory question. 
Finally, our comparison of treatment effects in Switzerland and China allow us to 
investigate how pre-existing levels of social concern interact with public discourse. Bartling et al. 
(2015) found that market actors in the Baseline condition in China exhibit substantially lower 
concern for mitigating negative externalities than those in Switzerland. We expect to replicate the 
finding in our Baseline treatment, that is, 𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾Switzerland,𝑑𝑑∅) > 𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾China,𝑑𝑑∅).  
If the finding replicates, we can investigate whether public discourse has a differential 
effect in a population with a low level of initial social concern (China) and one with a high level 
of social concern (Switzerland). Pre-existing levels of social concern and public discourse could 
be complements—this would be the case if a critical mass of baseline social concern is needed to 
produce compelling arguments for socially responsible behavior that sway the actions of market 
actors who would otherwise trade the harmful product. Alternatively, it could also be that baseline 
levels of social concern and public discourse are substitutes. For example, the high level of baseline 
social concern in Switzerland might leave little room to further strengthen norms of social 
responsibility, while the absence of such strong norms in China might create greater opportunity 
for developing them through public discourse. We thus investigate whether  
[𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾Switzerland,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡) − 𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾Switzerland,𝑑𝑑∅)] ⋚ [𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾China,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡) − 𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾China,𝑑𝑑∅)]. 
We do not make any assumptions about the nature of this relationship but study it as an exploratory 
question. 
3.3 Results 
In this section, we focus on market behavior in Study 1, to evaluate the impact of public discourse 
and study how public discourse influences social norms. We defer analysis of the content of the 
discourse to Section 5, where we conduct the analysis jointly for our two studies. 
 15 
3.3.1 Public Discourse Behind the Veil of Ignorance 
The two leftmost bars in the top panel of Figure 1 show the market shares of the fair product, our 
measure of social responsibility, in Baseline and Veil in Switzerland. The bottom panel shows the 
data for China.7  
Figure 1: Market Shares of the Fair Product 
 
Notes: The figure shows completed transactions and ignores the cases in which a consumer did not 
purchase a product. The bars indicate standard errors of the mean at the market level. 
 
                                                      
7 We exclude the 2.3 percent of cases in Switzerland and 3.5 percent of cases in China in which buyers did not make 
a purchase, thereby imposing no loss on third parties. Including these cases and counting them as socially responsible 












































The figure reveals that social responsibility increases substantially in both countries when 
market actors engage in public discourse behind the veil of ignorance prior to trading in the market. 
The market share of the fair product in Switzerland is about 50 percent in the Baseline condition, 
but rises to almost 100 percent in Veil.8  Turning to the data from China, we find that the Baseline 
market share of the fair product is only 15 percent, much lower than in Switzerland.9 However, 
the market share of the fair product almost quadruples to about 60 percent in Veil. Wilcoxon rank-
sum tests at the market (consumer) level indicate that the difference between Baseline and Veil is 
statistically significant in both countries; p=0.001 (p<0.001) for Switzerland and p=0.005 
(p<0.001) for China.10 The data thus provide clear support for hypothesis H1 in both countries.11 
Result 1: Public discourse behind the veil of ignorance increases socially 
responsible market behavior. 
3.3.2 Less Idealistic Forms of Public Discourse  
Our first discourse condition, Veil, implements the Rawlsian ideal of discourse behind the veil of 
ignorance and provides a potential upper bound for the effects of public discourse on socially 
responsible market behavior. Our second discourse condition, No Veil, deviates from the Rawlsian 
ideal: participants know their roles in the market prior to engaging in discourse.  
Figure 1 reveals that the market share of the fair product is reduced when the veil of 
ignorance is removed prior to public discourse, from 96 to 87 percent in Switzerland and from 59 
to 49 percent in China. Wilcoxon rank-sum tests indicate that the differences between Veil and No 
Veil are statistically significant at the market (consumer) level in Switzerland, p=0.014 (p=0.001), 
but not in China, p=0.248 (p=0.145). Hypothesis 2a is thus supported in Switzerland but not in 
China.  
                                                      
8 Figure A.1 in Appendix A shows that the fair-product market shares are generally stable across periods. Figure A.2 
shows the empirical cumulative distributions of fair-product market shares by treatment in both countries. 
9 The design of the Baseline condition in this paper is identical to the Baseline condition in Bartling et al. (2015), 
which also studied the same two populations. The market shares of the fair product in our Baseline conditions closely 
replicate the market shares in Bartling et al., both in Switzerland (44 and 48 percent across two studies) and China (16 
percent). 
10 Appendix Table A.1 provides p-values for all pairwise treatment comparisons. All Wilcoxon rank-sum tests reported 
in this paper are two-sided. 
11 The mean prices of the fair and harmful products are 29 and 24, respectively, in the Baseline in Switzerland. The 
respective prices in Veil are 29 and 21. Socially responsible buyers and sellers who trade the fair product thus share 
the additional cost of production. The same holds in China, where we observe similar average prices for the fair and 
harmful product: 25 and 22, respectively, in the Baseline and 28 and 21, respectively, in Veil. 
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Our third discourse condition, Exclusive, restricts participation in the discourse to buyers 
and sellers, thereby excluding the perspectives and arguments of those impacted by negative 
externalities. The rightmost bars in Figure 1 show the market share of the fair product in this 
condition. The figure illustrates that the market share of the fair product slightly increases in 
Switzerland (from 87 to 92 percent) but further decreases in China (from 49 to 37 percent). 
However, Wilcoxon rank-sum tests at the market (consumer) level indicate that the differences 
between No Veil and Exclusive are not consistently statistically significant; p=0.140 (p=0.049) for 
Switzerland and p=0.293 (p=0.055) for China. Thus, Hypothesis 2b is not supported in Switzerland 
and is directionally, but not statistically, supported in China.12 
Result 2: (a) The positive impact of public discourse on socially responsible market 
behavior tends to be slightly weaker when individuals discuss in front of rather than 
behind the veil of ignorance. (b) Excluding negatively affected third parties from 
public discourse, on top of removing the veil of ignorance, does not substantially 
weaken its positive impact.  
While we refrained from stating hypotheses regarding the impact of discourse in No Veil 
and Exclusive relative to our Baseline condition, Wilcoxon rank-sum tests indicate that the market 
share of the fair product is significantly higher in No Veil and Exclusive than in Baseline, both in 
Switzerland and China, irrespective of whether we test at the market or consumer level (p=0.001 
in all tests in Switzerland and p≤0.027 in all tests in China).  
Observation 1: Public discourse increases socially responsible market behavior 
even when individuals discuss in front of the veil of ignorance and even when 
negatively affected third parties are excluded from the discourse.  
As a complement to the above non-parametric tests, Table 2 reports random-effects 
generalized least squares regressions with consumers’ product choices—i.e., whether a consumer 
buys a fair or harmful product in a period—as dependent variable.13 The Baseline condition serves 
as the omitted category. We include binary treatment variables, Veil, No Veil and Exclusive, which 
                                                      
12 The prices of the fair and harmful products in No Veil and Exclusive are very similar to the respective prices in 
Baseline and Veil. The fair product trades at 29, on average, in both conditions in Switzerland and the harmful product 
trades at 23 and 20, respectively. The same holds for China. The fair product trades at 27, on average, in both 
conditions and the harmful product trades at 20 and 22, respectively. 
13 We report the results of Probit regressions in Table A.2 in Appendix A. 
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take on value 1 in the respective treatment and 0 otherwise. To evaluate the impact of discourse in 
general, we create the variable Discourse taking on value 1 in all three discourse treatments and 0 
otherwise. We include the general Discourse variable in models (3) and (6). In models (2), (3), (5) 
and (6) we control for time effects by including the variable Period, taking on integer values 
between 1 and 24, and the interactions of the treatment variables with Period. Models (1), (2) and 
(3) present results for Switzerland and models (4), (5) and (6) for China.  
Looking first at models (1) and (2) for Switzerland, the coefficients for Veil, No Veil and 
Exclusive are positive, substantially large in magnitude, and significant at the one percent level in 
both models. This indicates large, positive treatment effects of all public discourse treatments, 
which do not vary over time. Turning to China, model (4) again finds the level effects of discourse 
to be positive and statistically significant, although Exclusive is statistically significant only at the 
five percent level. In model (5), the interaction Period × Exclusive is positive and significant at 
the five percent level, while the coefficient for Exclusive is not statistically significant, indicating 
that the effect of discourse on socially responsible behavior develops over time in this condition 
in China. These results confirm our earlier results based on non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum 
tests.14 The positive and statistically highly significant coefficients for Discourse in models (3) 
and (6) indicate the general tendency in our data for all forms of discourse to increase socially 
responsible market behavior.15  
                                                      
14 The coefficients for Veil are consistent with the earlier stated results regarding H1 in both countries. Post-estimation 
tests of equality of the coefficients for Veil and No Veil in models (1) and (4) fail to reject equality in China but not in 
Switzerland; see p-values in Table A.3 in Appendix A. Post-estimation tests of equality of the coefficients for No Veil 
and Exclusive fail to reject equality in both countries.  
15 As an excursus, we also investigate a general methodological point relevant for understanding the impact of 
discourse and communication in experimental studies. One possible interpretation of the effect of providing 
participants with the opportunity to engage in public discourse is that the effect is due to communication itself, i.e., 
due to the exchange of messages. However, two changes result from introducing the option to communicate: first, 
subjects can exchange messages and, second, subjects are prompted and provided with the time to reflect on the topic 
about which they are communicating. In the case of our experiment, even if subjects did not actively engage in 
communication, the 8-minute discourse interval might also influence the choices they subsequently make by 
prompting them to think about appropriate market behavior. To provide insights into this distinction, we conducted a 
post hoc treatment in which we ask individuals to spend eight minutes reflecting and composing statements regarding 
appropriate market behavior, but these are not shared with other market participants. This Reflection condition 
increases market social responsibility relative to the Baseline. However, we also find that the effect of discourse 
extends beyond the effects of reflection in Switzerland, but not in China. Therefore, part of the impact of 
communication, and a great part of it in our experiment in China, seems to be driven by asking people to reflect on 
their behavior (see also Krupka and Weber, 2009). This finding suggests a role for public campaigns that do not 
actually require people to engage in communication, but instead simply ask them to consider their behavior. To 
conserve space, and given the tangential and post hoc nature of this part of our investigation, we report the details of 
the design and results of our Reflection condition in Appendix B. 
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Table 2: Random-effects GLS regressions of fair consumer product choice 
 Switzerland China 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Veil 0.457*** 0.416***  0.446*** 0.450***  
(0.057) (0.067)  (0.100) (0.111)  
No Veil 0.371*** 0.436***  0.342*** 0.419***  
(0.055) (0.067)  (0.079) (0.102)  
Exclusive 0.424*** 0.382***  0.244** 0.151  
(0.061) (0.077)  (0.093) (0.121)  
Discourse   0.412***   0.341*** 
  (0.065)   (0.098) 
Period  -0.003 -0.003  -0.004** -0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Period × Veil  0.003   -0.000  
 (0.003)   (0.005)  
Period × No Veil  -0.005   -0.006  
 (0.004)   (0.005)  
Period × Exclusive  0.003   0.007**  
 (0.003)   (0.004)  
Period × Discourse   0.000   0.000 
  (0.003)   (0.003) 
Constant 0.484*** 0.533*** 0.533*** 0.149** 0.203*** 0.203*** 
(0.051) (0.061) (0.061) (0.067) (0.084) (0.084) 
Observations 3770 3770 3770 3705 3705 3705 
Subjects 160 160 160 160 160 160 
Notes. The dependent variable in all models takes on value 1 if a buyer purchased a fair product and 0 if the buyer 
purchased a harmful product. We omit the cases in which consumers purchased no product. Baseline serves as 
omitted category. Period takes on integer values between 1 and 24. Discourse takes on value 1 in Veil, No Veil and 
Exclusive, and 0 otherwise. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level, *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
3.3.3 Public Discourse and Pre-Existing Social Concern 
The substantially different Baseline levels of social responsibly in Switzerland and China allow us 
to investigate the interaction of public discourse and pre-existing levels of social concern. Are they 
substitutes or complements? Table 3 reports random-effects GLS regressions using the pooled data 
from both countries.16 The dependent variable is the choice of the fair product. Baseline in 
Switzerland serves as omitted category. The large and highly significant coefficients for the four 
                                                      
16 The coefficient estimates of random-effects Probit regressions are reported in Table A.4 in Appendix A. 
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treatment variables in model (1) confirm our earlier findings for Switzerland. The large, negative 
and highly significant coefficient for China confirms the lower level of socially responsible 
behavior in the Baseline condition in China than in Switzerland, as shown in Figure 1, replicating 
the pattern reported in Bartling et al. (2015).  
Table 3: Random-effects GLS regressions of fair consumer product choice 
 (1) (2) 
Veil 0.457***  
 (0.056)  
No Veil 0.371***  
 (0.055)  
Exclusive 0.424***  
  (0.061)  
Discourse  0.417*** 
  (0.053) 
China -0.344*** -0.344*** 
 (0.084) (0.084) 
China × Veil -0.010  
 (0.114)  
China × No Veil -0.029  
 (0.096)  
China × Exclusive -0.180  
 (0.111)  
China × Discourse  -0.073 
  (0.094) 
Constant 0.494*** 0.494*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) 
Observations 7,475 7,475 
Subjects 320 320 
Notes. Baseline in Switzerland serves as omitted category. All standard errors (in parentheses) 
are clustered at the market level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
To test whether the effect of public discourse on social responsibility interacts with pre-
existing levels of concern for social impact, we interact the binary treatment variables with the 
country indicator China. The coefficients for China × Veil and China × No Veil in model (1) are 
very small and not statistically significant, indicating that entering into public discourse under 
these conditions has the same impact in Switzerland and China. The coefficient for China × 
Exclusive indicates, if anything, that public discourse without the involvement of potential victims 
of market activities has a smaller impact in China than in Switzerland, but this coefficient is not 
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statistically significant. The coefficient for China × Discourse in model (2), where Discourse takes 
on value 1 in all three discourse treatments and 0 otherwise, is consistent with the results from 
model (1) suggesting that the impact of public discourse is similar in Switzerland and China. The 
effect of public discourse on market social responsibility thus does not seem to depend on pre-
existing levels of market social responsibility.  
Observation 2: The positive effect of public discourse on socially responsible market 
behavior is independent of the pre-existing level of social concern. 
3.3.4 Social norms 
We next study the social norms we elicited regarding trading of the unfair product in our 
experimental markets. We collected ratings of the perceived social appropriateness of trading the 
harmful product, using the measure introduced by Krupka and Weber (2013). Subjects provided 
ratings of either “highly inappropriate” (−1), “somewhat inappropriate” (−1/3), “somewhat 
appropriate” (1/3) or “highly appropriate” (1) and were incentivized to provide the modal rating 
given by others.  
Figure 2 shows mean social appropriateness ratings by condition and country. The left 
panel shows the appropriateness ratings in Switzerland, while the panel on the right shows the 
ratings in China. First, comparing the social appropriateness ratings in Switzerland and China, the 
figure reveals that imposing social harm in the market is generally perceived as more appropriate 
in China than in Switzerland. In China, imposing harm on third parties is even considered slightly 
socially appropriate in the Baseline condition. Second, the figure reveals that ratings of the 
appropriateness of harmful market behavior are lower in all the discourse conditions, both in 
Switzerland and China, indicating that public discourse and subsequent market experience yield 
stronger norms prescribing socially responsible market behavior.17  
Table 4 reports the results of OLS regressions of the social norm ratings. Models (1) and 
(2) show, respectively, the results for Switzerland and China. The coefficients for Veil, No Veil, 
and Exclusive in Study 1 are all negative and statistically significant, both in China and 
Switzerland, indicating that when subjects engage in public discourse, they subsequently evaluate 
trading the harmful product as less socially appropriate.18 
                                                      
17 Interestingly, the impact of thinking in private about social responsibility in our additional Reflection condition 
produces an effect on social norms in China, but not in Switzerland (see Appendix B). 
18 The results of ordered Probit regressions are reported in Table A.5 in Appendix A.  
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Figure 2: Effect of Public Discourse on Social Norms 
 
Notes. The figure shows the average rating of the appropriateness of exchanging the harmful 
product. “Highly Appropriate = 1,” “Somewhat Appropriate = 1/3,” “Somewhat Inappropriate = 
-1/3,” “Highly Inappropriate = -1.” The numerical rating values follow Krupa and Weber (2013). 
The bars show the standard error of the mean at the market level. 
 
 
Table 4: OLS regressions of social appropriateness ratings 
 
 Switzerland China 
 (1) (2) 
Veil -0.469*** -0.354*** 
 (0.054) (0.102) 
No Veil  -0.333*** -0.156**  
(0.054) (0.065) 
Exclusive -0.375*** -0.245*** 
 (0.071) (0.086) 
Constant -0.370*** 0.255***  
(0.023) (0.055) 
Observations 512 512 
Notes. The dependent variable in all models takes values from -1 to 1 corresponding to the scores 
previously described. Baseline serves as omitted category. All standard errors (in parentheses) 






























4. Study 2 
Study 1 shows that various forms of public discourse substantially increase socially responsible 
market behavior. These effects obtain in two independent samples, which differ in their pre-
existing levels of social concern.  
In this section, we investigate the robustness of our main qualitative result that public 
discourse increases socially responsible market behavior. It is important to consider whether 
particular features of laboratory experiments, which may not be present outside the laboratory, 
might exaggerate the positive impact of public discourse on market social responsibility.  
For instance, the fact that the external effect falls on another experimental subject, who 
differs from market actors only in a random draw of roles, might make the related earnings 
inequalities particularly salient and clearly resolvable in the context of the experiment. In contrast, 
market externalities in most non-laboratory contexts typically involve external impacts on more 
distant individuals, as well as impacts that are not as easily quantifiable or remediable. In such 
contexts, discourse about the “right” thing to do might be more nuanced and may facilitate 
opposing arguments. In Study 2, therefore, we change the impact of the externality to affect, rather 
than another experimental subject, a charity committed to fighting climate change and poverty in 
low-income countries.  
Moreover, public debate outside the laboratory about appropriate market behavior typically 
occurs after people have a history of interactions in the relevant market and have developed 
behaviors that produce a negative externality. This could be important because changing 
established behavior might be particularly challenging, thus mitigating the impact that public 
discourse can have on promoting social responsibility, or perhaps even leading to rationalizations 
for existing behavior that further depress social responsibility. Market actors may have developed 
habits, strive to behave in a consistent way, or not want to change their behaviors because this 
would be an acknowledgement that past behaviors were not “appropriate.”  In Study 2, we thus 
examine whether public discourse still has a positive effect when it is introduced only after firms 
and consumers have already traded for several periods in our experimental market.   
4.1 Experimental Design 
A market in Study 2 comprises 11 subjects: six firms and five consumers. At the beginning of 
every period, each participant receives an initial endowment of 100 points. In addition, we allocate 
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each market with a 500-point donation (corresponding to 100 points for each consumer) to the 
charitable organization “Carbon Offsets To Alleviate Poverty,” which funds programs fighting 
climate change and poverty in low-income countries (see https://cotap.org/). 100 points correspond 
to CHF 25 (about USD 25).  
Subjects can earn additional points from their market transactions. As in Study 1, they can 
exchange two types of products that differ in their impact on the COTAP charity. If a firm and a 
consumer exchange the fair product (or no product at all), then there is no reduction of the 
donation. But if a product with a negative external impact is exchanged, then the donation is 
reduced by 60. While the harmful product costs nothing to produce, the fair product’s production 
cost is 20. Both types of products have the identical value of 50 to a consumer.  
As in Study 1, firms simultaneously select product types and prices (between 0 and 50) in 
a posted-offer market. Once all firms make their choices, consumers enter the market sequentially 
and decide whether to buy at most one product. If a firm sells its offered product, it earns the 
difference between price and production cost. If a consumer decides to buy a product, he or she 
earns the difference between the value of 50 and the price. If a consumer buys a harmful product, 
the donation is reduced from 100 to 40. If the consumer buys a fair product or no product at all, 
the donation is unaffected. The market game is repeated for 24 periods. One period is randomly 
drawn at the end of a session to determine payments. 
We implement three different treatment conditions. In Baseline (Charity), subjects directly 
proceed to the market game after learning their roles as firm or consumer, as in Baseline in Study 
1. In Exclusive (Charity), the market game is preceded by 8 minutes of public discourse, in which 
firms and consumers have the opportunity to discuss the appropriateness of exchanging the 
harmful product without participation by those impacted by the externality, as in the Exclusive 
condition of Study 1. We also vary the point in time when market actors engage in discourse in 
Study 2. Experienced (Charity) is identical to Exclusive (Charity), except that firms and consumers 
have the possibility to communicate only after having played the first eight periods of the market 
game (“Part I”). They then continue interacting in the market for the remaining 16 periods (“Part 
II”).19 Table 5 provides an overview of the sequence of events in all conditions in Study 2.20 
                                                      
19 For consistency, all conditions in Study 2 included “Part I” and “Part II.” In Baseline (Charity) and Exclusive 
(Charity), the experiment continued in Part II as before.  
20  The instructions for Study 2 are in Appendix G. 
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Table 5: Overview of Experimental Conditions in Study 2 
 Baseline (Charity) Exclusive (Charity) Experienced (Charity) 
t=1 ̶ Public discourse ̶ 
t=2 Subjects play the market game for 8 periods (“Part I”) 
t=3 ̶ ̶ Public discourse  
t=4 Subjects play the market game for 16 periods (“Part II”) 
 
We conducted the study at the University of Zurich, following the same procedures as in 
Study 1. We collected 16 markets per treatment, with each market consisting of 11 subjects, such 
that a total of 528 subjects participated. In all conditions, we elicit social norms at the end of the 
market, using the same elicitation method as in Study 1. 
4.2 Hypotheses 
Based on the results of Study 1, we expect public discourse to again have a positive effect on 
market social responsibility, even when those impacted by the externality do not participate. 
H3: 𝜃𝜃�𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉 (𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎)� > 𝜃𝜃�𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵𝑉𝑉 (𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎)� 
However, the Exclusive versus Baseline comparison in Study 2 is not a direct replication of these 
treatments in Study 1, due to the distinct impact of the externality on a charity rather than on other 
experimental subjects. Therefore, as we note earlier, there are compelling reasons to expect no 
positive impact of public discourse, or even a negative impact, in such a setting. 
 Conditional on there being a positive impact of Exclusive (Charity) in Study 2, we expect 
that the positive impacts of discourse will be weaker when participants have a history of engaging 
in exchange that yields negative externalities and a desire to rationalize or continue with their pre-
existing behavior.  
H4: 𝜃𝜃�𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉 (𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎)� > 𝜃𝜃�𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸 (𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎)� 
 Finally, whether or not Experienced (Charity) ends up at higher, equal or lower levels of 
market social responsibility than Baseline (Charity) is a research question for which we have no a 
priori predictions. 
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4.3  Results 
Figure 3 shows market share of the fair product across periods in all three treatments. The Baseline 
(Charity) condition shows a steady market share of approximately 50 percent throughout all 24 
periods. When market actors enter into public discourse before interacting in the market, in the 
Exclusive (Charity) condition, the market share of fair products increases to 79 percent. Wilcoxon 
rank-sum tests at the market (consumer) level indicate that the difference in the average market 
share of the fair product between Baseline (Charity) and Exclusive (Charity) is statistically 
significant; p=0.002 (p<0.001). This supports Hypothesis 3 and qualitatively replicates the finding 
in Study 1 that public discourse increases socially responsible behavior, even when it involves 
only those individuals who exchange in the market and personally benefit from exchanging the 
harmful product.  
Result 3: Public discourse increases socially responsible market behavior, even 
when the negative impact of the externality falls on a charity that is not represented 
in the discourse.  
We next examine whether the positive impact of public discourse is weaker if market 
participants have experience in trading in the market prior to engaging in discourse. Figure 3 
reveals that the market share of the fair product in Experienced (Charity) increases substantially 
from levels around 60 percent at the end of Part I, which is conducted before the public discourse 
takes place, to levels around 80 percent in Part II, after public discourse. Wilcoxon rank-sum tests 
at the market (consumer) level confirm that the average market shares of the fair product are 
different in Parts I and II (63 percent vs. 79 percent) in Experienced (Charity); p=0.041 (p<0.001). 
The finding that public debate is effective even when market actors have prior experience in the 
market is corroborated by the observation that the market shares of the fair product in Part II in No 
Veil (Charity) and Experienced (Charity), which differ only in whether public discourse took place 
either prior or subsequent to Part I, are almost identical, 76 percent vs. 79 percent, and not 
significantly different in Wilcoxon rank-sum tests at the market (consumer); p=0.568 (0.357).21 
                                                      
21 We observe an increase of the market share of the fair product between Parts I and II in Experienced (Charity) 
despite the fact that the market share of the fair product in Part I is already high (63 percent), relative to Baseline 
(Charity) (50 percent). Wilcoxon rank-sum tests at the market (consumer) level show that the difference in Part I is 
statistically (marginally) significant; p=0.083 (0.036), despite the fact that the instructions and procedures in Baseline 
(Charity) and Experienced (Charity) are identical up to the end of Part I. 
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Observation 3: Public discourse increases socially responsible market behavior 
even with experienced market participants.  
Figure 3: Market Shares of the Fair Product in Study 2 
 
Notes: The figure shows completed transactions and ignores the cases in which a consumer did not 
purchase a product. Shaded areas represent standard errors of the mean. 
The regression models in Table 6 corroborate the above findings and allow a more precise 
test of Hypothesis 4 that controls for differences in Part I behavior. The dependent variable is the 
choice of the fair product. Both models report coefficient estimates of random-effects GLS 
regressions.22 The binary treatment variables Exclusive (Charity) and Experienced (Charity) take 
on values of 1 in the corresponding conditions, while Baseline (Charity) is the omitted category. 
Model 1 identifies the difference in social responsibility between Part I and Part II in each 
treatment, with Part I the omitted category. The large and positive coefficient for Exclusive 
(Charity) indicates that, relative to Baseline (Charity), socially responsible behavior is higher in 
Part I, following public discourse. The marginally significant coefficient for Experienced (Charity) 
captures the slightly higher frequency of fair products exchanged in Part I in this condition, relative 
to the Baseline (Charity). More importantly, the large and highly statistically significant 
                                                      
































coefficient for Part II × Experienced (Charity) indicates that, following public discourse, the 
frequency of socially responsible behavior increases substantially, even when participants have 
previous market experience. Model 2 additionally allows for a time trend in each condition. 
Exclusive (Charity) and Part II × Experienced (Charity) retain their large, positive and statistically 
significant coefficients. 
Table 6: GLS (random-effects) regression of fair consumer product choice 
 (1) (2) 
Exclusive (Charity) 0.326*** 0.362***  
(0.073) (0.073) 
Experienced (Charity) 0.126* 0.176*** 
 (0.064) (0.063) 
Part II -0.004 -0.038** 
 (0.025) (0.017) 
Part II × Exclusive (Charity) -0.071* -0.025 
(0.039) (0.037) 
Part II × Experienced (Charity) 0.159*** 0.291***  
(0.055) (0.053) 
Period   0.003  
 (0.002) 
Period × Exclusive (Charity)  -0.008*** 
 (0.002) 
Period × Experienced (Charity)  -0.011*** 
  (0.003) 
Constant 0.509*** 0.497***  
(0.051) (0.052) 
Observations 5,619 5,619 
Number of subjects 240 240 
Test: Exclusive (Charity) =  
Part II ×  X Experienced (Charity) p = 0.08 p = 0.44 
 
Notes: The dependent variable in all models takes on value 1 if a buyer purchased a fair product 
and 0 if the buyer purchased a harmful product. We omit the cases in which the consumer 
purchased no product. Baseline and Part I serve as omitted categories. Exclusive (Charity) and 
Experienced (Charity) are binary variables taking on value 1 in the corresponding condition and 0 
otherwise. Part II is a binary variable taking on value 1 for data from period 9 to 24 and 0 
otherwise. Period takes on integer values between 1 and 24. Standard errors (in parentheses) are 
clustered at the market level. The final row reports the p-value from a Wald test of the equality of 
the two coefficients. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
Turning to Hypothesis 4, the final row in the table provides the p-value from a Wald test 
of the equality of the two key treatment coefficients: Exclusive (Charity) and Part II × Experienced 
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(Charity). In both models, we fail to reject at conventional significance levels that the treatment 
effects are equivalent. Therefore, while directionally the results suggest that the impact of public 
discourse is slightly lower for experienced market participants, this can be at least partly attributed 
to idiosyncratic differences in Part I behavior. 
Result 4: While the effect of public discourse is smaller for experienced than 
inexperienced participants, this difference is not statistically significant.   
Overall, Table 6 confirms the most important observation from Study 2: both public 
discourse interventions have large and positive effects on socially responsible market behavior; 
the treatment effects are statistically significant at the p<0.01 level. These findings qualitatively 
replicate the results from Study 1, in which all discourse conditions also had large and positive 
effects.23  
Figure 4: Effect of Public Discourse on Social Norms in Study 2 
 
Notes. The figure shows the average rating of the appropriateness of exchanging the 
harmful product. The bars show the standard error of the mean at the market level. 
                                                      
23 As in Study 1, fair products trade at higher prices, on average, than harmful products. The fair product trades, on 
average, at a price of 32, 34 and 34 in Baseline (Charity), Exclusive (Charity) and Experienced (Charity), respectively. 
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Finally, we also again observe an effect of the public discourse on social norms. Figure 4 
presents the mean ratings of the social appropriateness of exchanging the harmful product, elicited 
at the end of the experiment. In the Baseline (Charity) condition, exchanging the harmful product 
is perceived to be slightly socially inappropriate, but in both conditions with public discourse, such 
behavior is perceived to be substantially more socially inappropriate. A regression of the kind in 
Table 4 using data from Study 2 shows that both treatment effects on perceptions of social 
appropriateness are highly statistically significant.24 
5. Content of the Public Discourse 
In this section, we analyze the content of the public discourse from both studies. The vast majority 
of subjects actively participated in the discourse by sending at least one message—98 and 95 
percent of the subjects in Switzerland in Studies 1 and 2, respectively, and 98 percent of the 
subjects in China. On average, subjects made 6 and 4 statements in Switzerland in Studies 1 and 
2, respectively, and 11 statements in China.  
To classify the content of the debate, we recruited additional subjects to work as coders. 
These subjects had not participated in the earlier studies and were unaware of our research design 
or the treatment variation. We provided coders with a general description of the market experiment 
that was similar to the instructions in the experiment. The coders’ task was to classify the content 
of the messages into categories. Our focus is on the following five categories: Recommending No 
impact on third parties (i.e., on passive participants in Study 1 or on the donation to the charity in 
Study 2), recommending Impact on third parties, Fairness, Efficiency and Self-interest. For 
example, recommending No impact refers to any statement supporting the exchange of the fair 
product or a boycott of the harmful one. Recommending Impact involves statements of support for 
the harmful product. Fairness corresponds to any statement appealing to fairness, the “right thing 
to do,” morality or demonstrating empathy for third parties. Efficiency and Self-interest similarly 
require appeals to such motivations. Coders saw the complete transcript for discourse in a market 
and rated each independent statement as belonging to one or more categories. The coders could 
classify each message into more than one category. Each market’s discourse was evaluated by four 
                                                      
24 Specifically, the estimated regression coefficients (standard errors) for Exclusive (Charity) and Experienced 
(Charity) are both negative and statistically significant at p<0.01 (see Table C.2 in Appendix C). 
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different coders.25 In our analysis, we consider a statement as belonging to a category if at least 3 
of the 4 coders assigned it to that category.  
Table 7: Fraction of subjects sending at least one message belonging to a category 
 Study 1  Study 2 (Switz.) 
 Veil No Veil Exclusive  Exclusive 
(Charity) 
Experienced 
(Charity)  Switz. China Switz. China Switz. China  
No impact  0.59 0.39 0.67 0.35 0.69 0.27  0.54 0.56 
Impact  0.09 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.11 0.22  0.12 0.14 
Fairness 0.51 0.43 0.58 0.47 0.65 0.29  0.31 0.39 
Efficiency 0.14 0.14 0.27 0.14 0.20 0.09  0.17 0.24 
Self-interest 0.10 0.14 0.06 0.21 0.18 0.30  0.08 0.10 
Notes. The table reports coding requiring that at least three of the four coders agree. “Switz.” is short for 
Switzerland. 
Table 7 shows the fraction of subjects that sent at least one message belonging to a 
category, separately for each study and condition and separately for Switzerland and China.26 For 
example, the top left cell in the table shows that 59 percent of subjects recommended not 
exchanging the harmful product (No impact) in condition Veil in Switzerland, while the cell 
immediately below shows that only nine percent argued for imposing negative externalities 
(Impact). The table shows that it is generally the case that a larger fraction of subjects argues for 
avoiding negative social impact (No impact) rather than for imposing the externality (Impact), a 
pattern that holds in each of the 8 different cases, i.e. in all conditions in both studies and locations. 
The table further shows that appeals to Fairness are typically much more frequent than either 
Efficiency or Self-interest; a pattern observed in all but one of the 16 possible comparisons. The 
one exception is in the Exclusive condition in China, where appeals to Self-interest are made by 
slightly more subjects than statements in support of Fairness. We also observe that arguments 
relating to Self-interest are made more often in China than in Switzerland in all three conditions in 
Study 1.  
                                                      
25 We organized three sessions with 32 coders each. Each coder classified the discourse transcript in four markets. We 
provided the coders with a detailed description of each category. Besides a residual category, No category/Unclear, 
we also gave the coders the following additional categories: Agreement, Questions about what to do in the market 
game, General discussion of the game or the experiment, and Discussion of prices. Each statement had to belong to 
at least one category. The specific category descriptions provided to the coders are in Table D.1 in Appendix D for 
Study 1 and Table E.1 in Appendix E for Study 2. Tables D.2 and E.2 show the fraction of messages that are assigned 
to each category in Study 1 and 2, respectively. Tables D.3 and E.3 show the fraction of markets in which at least one 
message belongs to a specific category for Study 1 and 2, respectively. 
26 For the Exclusive condition, we consider only the statements made by buyers and sellers. Even though third parties 
also engaged in discourse, separately, these messages are irrelevant for shaping market behavior.  
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In the following, we study the extent to which buyers’ market behavior is (i) related to own 
statements made during public discourse and (ii) affected by the statements made by other market 
participants. Table 8 reports coefficient estimates from OLS regressions in which the dependent 
variable is the proportion of fair products bought. The unit of observation is a buyer. Each cell in 
the table shows the coefficient from a separate regression in which the corresponding category is 
the only explanatory variable. Columns (1) to (3) show the coefficient estimates for binary 
explanatory variables taking on the value of 1 if a buyer sent at least one message belonging to a 
given category and zero otherwise. We use that same compact way of reporting regression 
coefficients in columns (4) to (6), where the explanatory variables capture the fraction of other 
participants in the public discourse who sent at least one message belonging to a given category.27 
Columns (1) and (4) show the results for Study 1 in Switzerland, columns (2) and (5) for Study 1 
in China and columns (3) and (6) for Study 2.28 We pool the data from the three discourse 
conditions in Study 1 (Veil, No Veil, Exclusive) and from the two discourse conditions in Study 2 
(Exclusive (Charity), Part II of Experienced (Charity)) in the respective regressions. 
The signs of the coefficients reported in columns (1) to (3) show that the buyers’ own 
contributions to the public debate are related to their purchasing behavior in sensible ways. For 
instance, we expect arguing for No impact to be positively associated with purchasing fair 
products, while arguing for Impact to have a negative association. In Switzerland in Study 1, we 
find that the associations between statements made in the public debate and behavior in the market 
are weak. In column (1), only the coefficient for Fairness is marginally statistically significant. A 
possible reason for the weak associations is the high market shares of the fair product in all three 
discourse conditions, which leaves relatively little variation to be explained. For example, in 
condition Veil in Switzerland in Study 1, 73 percent of all buyers never purchased the unfair 
product. In Study 1 in China, in contrast, all five coefficients shown in column (2) are at least 
marginally statistically significant. The association between contributions to the public debate and 
market behavior is particularly strong and highly significant for No impact, Fairness and 
                                                      
27 In Veil and No Veil, other participants are the four other buyers, six sellers and five third parties. In Exclusive, 
Exclusive (Charity) and Experienced (Charity) other participants are the four other buyers and six sellers.  
28 We report all regressions in more detail in Tables D.4 through D.7 in Appendix D for Study 1 and Tables E.4 and 
E.5 in Appendix E for Study 2. We also report analogous regression analyses for sellers (see Tables D.8 through D.11 
for Study 1 and Tables E.6 and E.7 for Study 2); these results are qualitatively similar.  
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Efficiency. The coefficients for Switzerland in Study 2, shown in column (3), reveal that the 
association is particularly strong and highly significant for No impact, Impact and Self-interest.  
Table 8: OLS regression coefficients of the fraction of fair products purchased by a buyer 
 Buyer’s own statements  Other’s statements 
 Study 1  Study 2  Study 1  Study 2 
 Switzerland China    Switzerland China   
 (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 
No impact 0.048 0.179***  0.215***  -0.090 0.189  0.251*** 
 (0.033) (0.063)  (0.042)  (0.081) (0.155)  (0.121) 
Impact -0.041 -0.130*  -0.294***  0.008 -0.242  -0.904*** 
 (0.066) (0.071)  (0.062)  (0.151) (0.268)  (0.168) 
Fairness 0.068* 0.207***  0.056  -0.006 0.302  -0.052 
 (0.037) (0.052)  (0.057)  (0.080) (0.186)  (0.183) 
Efficiency 0.049 0.219***  0.079  0.018 -0.171  0.170 
 (0.036) (0.077)  (0.056)  (0.066) (0.394)  (0.211) 
Self-interest -0.096 -0.141*  -0.245***  0.089 -0.404*  -0.907** 
 (0.068) (0.076)  (0.077)  (0.180) (0.207)  (0.401) 
Observations 120 120  160  120 120  160 
Notes. The columns report the coefficients of regressions of the proportion of the fair product purchased by a 
buyer on whether the buyer made a particular statement (columns 1 to 3) and on the fraction of other participants 
who made that statement in the public debate (columns 4 to 6). We pool the data for all discourse conditions in 
a given country and study. For Study 2, we include only purchasing behavior from Part II. The columns show 
the coefficients for each category in models that regress the fraction of the fair product on each of the categories 
separately. That is, each coefficient corresponds to a separate regression with only one explanatory variable. 
We omit the cases in which a buyer purchased no product. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the 
market level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The coefficients reported in columns (4) to (6) suggest some influence of others statements 
on buyers’ purchasing behavior. In all cases where a coefficient is at least marginally significant, 
it has the expected sign. Overall, however, the associations are weaker compared to the models 
shown in columns (1) to (3). In Switzerland in Study 1, were we have relatively little variation in 
buyers’ purchasing behavior, none of the coefficients is statistically significant. For China, only 
the coefficient for Self-interest is marginally significant. We find that buyers are most strongly 
influenced by other market participants’ statements in Study 2. All five coefficients have the 
expected sign, and the coefficients for No impact and Impact are highly significant, while the 
coefficient on Self-interest is significant at the five percent level.  
Despite the intuitive associations that we regularly observe in Table 8, we interpret these 
findings only very cautiously. We have no reason to claim that these relationships are causal—
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e.g., it is very likely that consumers inclined to buy the fair product are more likely to make 
statements supporting such behavior. Moreover, this portion of our analysis is highly exploratory 
and should be taken with caution due to the likely presence of noise in coding and interpreting the 
statements. Nevertheless, it is reassuring that the analysis of the transcripts provides some 
indication that the messages sent during discourse are reflective of participants’ subsequent market 
behavior. 
6. Conclusions 
We investigate the extent to which public discourse—whereby individuals can engage in 
communication and discuss what constitutes appropriate behavior—influences socially 
responsible market behavior and the norms governing such conduct. Our main finding is quite 
striking: all of our conditions that introduce public discourse produce substantially higher degrees 
of market social responsibility, relative to a control condition in which discourse is absent. Across 
eight such comparisons—six in Study 1 and two in Study 2—and in two populations, one from 
Switzerland and one from China, that vary in their pre-existing degrees of market social 
responsibility, we always find the positive effects of public discourse to be large in magnitude and 
statistically significant. This is particularly surprising, since we designed many of our conditions 
to introduce features we thought would likely eliminate the positive impacts of public discourse, 
or possibly even yield negative effects on socially responsible conduct. Thus, our study provides 
consistent evidence that deliberation can lead groups of anonymous individuals to change their 
market behavior in a way that reduces negative external effects and yields greater aggregate 
welfare.  
We also find that public discourse impacts social norms regarding appropriate market 
behavior. Combined with the persistent positive impacts across rounds in our experiment—from a 
single early experience engaging in public discourse—this suggests that the benefits of discourse 
are not transitory. 
 While our results echo similar positive impacts of communication in other settings, such 
as social dilemmas, our findings provide an important novel direction for such research. Unlike 
earlier work, our study finds large positive impacts of communication in a setting in which those 
communicating ultimately end up worse off in terms of material outcomes as a result of the actions 
that they agree to take in the public discourse. Aside from demonstrating a new way in which 
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communication can improve efficiency, this finding is of crucial importance for our motivating 
research question. Public campaigns and discourse can mitigate harmful external impacts of 
market activity only by stimulating voluntary change towards more costly production 
technologies. Thus, the finding that it is possible for collections of anonymous individuals to reach 
such agreements that then shape their market behavior is important. However, whether such 
positive impacts extend to market settings comprising tens or hundreds of thousands of consumers 
remains an open question. 
 Indeed, our work also requires additional important caveats. While we investigate many 
treatment comparisons that vary the nature of public discourse, there are of course many additional 
potentially important factors that we omit. This includes important sources of heterogeneity among 
market actors, such as nationality, ethnicity and income, which may make it difficult to obtain 
agreements. Furthermore, the specific nature of technology and discourse can vary in many ways 
that extend far beyond the simple kind of discussions in our study. Nevertheless, our design can 
be easily extended to incorporate heterogeneity and other forms of discourse in order to investigate 
the importance of these factors. 
Additionally, the degree to which laboratory findings generalize to non-laboratory settings 
is an important concern with all laboratory experiments. Our study is motivated by the observation 
of large public discourse campaigns around the World intended to promote more responsible 
market conduct. Whether such campaigns are effective is an open question that is challenging to 
address with non-laboratory data, where it is impossible to observe counterfactuals or exogenously 
manipulate the presence and nature of such discourse. Our laboratory evidence provides an 
indication that the kind of discourse encouraged by such campaigns can facilitate socially 
responsible market behavior. We make no claims that it will always, or even necessarily 
frequently, do so. Nevertheless, the robustness of our main finding to our attempts to introduce 
additional features, motivated by observations outside the laboratory, to reduce the positive impact 
of public discourse suggest that the positive impacts we observe may be grounded on a strong 
behavioral foundation. Thus, while our results provide compelling evidence that public discourse 
can enhance market social responsibility, one of our key contributions is to provide a starting point 
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Supplemental Appendix  
 
A. Study 1: Additional Figures and Tables 
Figure A.1: Market shares of fair products over periods by treatment and country 
 
Notes. The figure shows completed transactions and ignores the cases in which a consumer did 
not purchase a product. Data are aggregated in blocks of two periods to smooth random 

























































Figure A.2: CDFs of market shares of fair products by treatment and country  
 
Notes. The figure shows completed transactions and ignores the cases in which a consumer did 
not purchase a product. We conducted eight markets per treatment, which serve as units of 
observation in the figure. 
 
 
Table A.1: Wilcoxon rank-sum tests at the market (consumer) level, two-sided 
p-values Baseline Veil No Veil Exclusive 




















Notes. The p-values in the lower triangle correspond to Switzerland, the p-values in the 
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Table A.2: Random-effects probit regressions of fair consumer product choice 
 Switzerland China 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Veil 3.368*** 3.171***  1.966*** 1.798***  
 (0.516) (0.550)  (0.392) (0.359)  
No Veil 1.827*** 2.538***  1.571*** 1.603***  
 (0.364) (0.514)  (0.336) (0.330)  
Exclusive 2.635*** 2.399***  1.149*** 0.591  
 (0.530) (0.570)  (0.373) (0.418)  
Discourse   2.817***   1.374*** 
   (0.418)   (0.326) 
Period  -0.013* -0.013*  -0.033** -0.033** 
  (0.007) (0.007)  (0.013) (0.013) 
Period × Veil  0.018   0.016  
  (0.019)   (0.018)  
Period × No Veil  -0.049***   0.000  
  (0.019)   (0.019)  
Period × Exclusive  0.021   0.047***  
  (0.021)   (0.017)  
Period × Discourse   -0.016   0.019 
   (0.014)   (0.011) 
Constant 0.191 0.357* 0.371* -1.560*** -1.190*** -1.201*** 
 (0.149) (0.189) (0.168) (0.316) (0.285) (0.285) 
Observations 3770 3770 3770 3705 3705 3705 
Subjects 160 160 160 160 160 160 
Notes. The dependent variable in all models takes on value 1 if a buyer purchased a fair product and 
0 if the buyer purchased a harmful product. We omit the cases in which consumers purchased no 
product. Baseline serves as omitted category. Period takes on integer values between 1 and 24. 
Discourse takes on value 1 in Veil, No Veil and Exclusive, and 0 otherwise. The table reports raw 
probit coefficients. All standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level, *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A.3: Tests of equality of coefficients from regressions of fair consumer 
product choice 
p-values  Veil No Veil Exclusive 
Veil - 0.217  0.038  
No Veil 0.009  - 0.203 
Exclusive 0.448 0.186  - 
Notes. To test for equality of coefficients, we use the results of model (1) for Switzerland and 
model (4) for China of Table 3. The p-values in the shaded area correspond to China and the 
rest to Switzerland. 
 
 
Table A.4: Random-effects probit regressions of fair consumer product choice 
 (1) (2) 
Veil 3.028***  
 (0.477)  
No Veil 1.681***  
 (0.303)  
Exclusive 2.370***  
  (0.432)  
Discourse  2.297*** 
  (0.297) 
China -1.758*** -1.779*** 
 (0.447) (0.451) 
China × Veil -0.976  
 (0.683)  
China × No Veil -0.039  
 (0.512)  
China × Exclusive -1.169*  
 (0.646)  
China × Discourse  -0.649 
  (0.513) 
Constant 0.132 0.139 
 (0.222) (0.224) 
Observations 7475 7475 
Number of Subjects 320 320 
Notes. Baseline in Switzerland serves as omitted category in this model. All standard 











Veil -1.358*** -0.951*** 
 (0.228) (0.276) 
No Veil -0.859*** -0.447** 
 (0.158) (0.181) 
Exclusive -0.985*** -0.672*** 
 (0.226) (0.238) 
Observations 512 512 
Notes. The dependent variable in all models take values from -1 to 1. 
Baseline serves as omitted category. All standard errors (in parentheses) 
are clustered at the market level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table A.6: Tests of equality of coefficients from regressions of social 
appropriateness 
p-values Veil No Veil Exclusive 
Veil - 0.037 0.316 
No Veil 0.057 - 0.236 
Exclusive 0.265 0.618 - 
Notes. To test for equality of coefficients, we use the results of model (1) for 
Switzerland and model (2) for China of Table 4. The p-values in the shaded area 
correspond to China and the rest to Switzerland. 
 
 
B. Supplementary Condition: Reflection 
In this section, we report the results of an additional, post hoc, treatment added to Study 1 in order 
to investigate the extent to which the positive impact of public discourse on market social 
responsibility is due to discourse per se—i.e., the exchange of views and arguments between 
market participants—or due to prompting individuals to spend time thinking about appropriate 
market behavior, which does not necessarily involve discourse. In fact, earlier experiments that 
study the role of communication in strategic settings typically confound these two mechanisms. 
To separate these two possible channels, we conducted condition Reflection. As in No Veil, 
subjects in Reflection first learn their roles in the market game. In contrast to No Veil, however, 
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subjects do not have the opportunity to enter into a public discourse with others but can, instead, 
write their thoughts about what constitutes “appropriate” or “acceptable” market behavior 
privately into the computer interface. This way, subjects are encouraged to think about appropriate 
market behavior without being influenced by others.29  
The Reflection condition also allows us to investigate a kind of prime often present in 
campaigns that are intended to foster socially responsible behavior by encouraging people to think 
about their behavior and the right thing to do. Does encouraging people to think about the 
appropriateness of their behavior change their market behavior?  
Figure B.1 illustrates that encouraging people to think about the appropriateness of their 
market behavior fosters socially responsible behavior in our experimental markets, both in 
Switzerland and China. The market share of the fair product is 67 percent in Reflection in 
Switzerland, compared to 49 percent in Baseline. The same result prevails in China, where the 
market share of the fair product is 43 percent in Reflection, compared to 15 percent in Baseline. 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test at the market (consumer) levels indicate that these differences are 
statistically significant; p=0.036 (p=0.023) for Switzerland and p=0.016 (p=0.000) for China.30  
Figure B.1 further illustrates the additional impact of discourse per se, i.e., the impact of 
discourse on top of making people think about appropriate market behavior, by comparing markets 
shares of the fair product in Reflection and No Veil. The effect of discourse in No Veil is about 
twice as large as the effect of private deliberation in Reflection in Switzerland. In China, in 
contrast, the effect of private deliberation is almost as large as the effect of discourse. Indeed, the 
difference between Reflection and No Veil is statistically significant only in Switzerland, p=0.002 
(p=0.011), but not in China, p=0.207 (p=0.196). Overall, the data show that a sizable part of the 
effect of public discourse on socially responsible market behavior is driven by encouraging people 
to think about the appropriateness of their behavior, suggesting that public campaigns can also be 
effective when they prompt individuals to think about the consequences of their market activities. 
Indeed, many campaigns take this form. 
  
                                                      
29 We collected data from 8 markets with 16 participants each in both countries; hence, 256 subjects participated in 
total in condition Reflection. We followed the same procedures as described in Section 3.1.4. 
30 The prices of the fair and harmful products in Reflection are comparable to all other conditions. The fair and harmful 
products trade, on average, at 26 and 20, respectively, in Switzerland and at 26 and 18, respectively, in China. 
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Figure B.1: Public Discourse vs. Reflection 
 
Notes: The figure shows completed transactions and ignores the cases in which a consumer 
did not purchase a product, thereby imposing no loss on third parties. The intervals correspond 
to the standard error of the mean at the market level. 
 
The results from this section might be of broader interest, beyond our particular research 
question, in light of the large literature on communication in games. Experimental papers that 
study the effect of adding some form of communication among players to a game typically do not 
disentangle whether communication per se causes treatment differences or whether these 
differences are observed because the option to communicate prompts players to think about their 
behavior and provides them with time to do so. However, in many cases it can be of interest to 
better understand the underlying mechanisms that drive behavioral change. In our particular case, 
for example, it is valuable to know that a policy that encourages people to think about what 
constitutes “appropriate” market behavior can be effective, even without providing the opportunity 









































C. Study 2: Additional Tables 
Table C.1: Random-effects Probit regressions of fair consumer product choice 
 (1) (2) 
Exclusive (Charity) 1.783*** 2.061***  
(0.464) (0.486) 
Experienced (Charity) 0.433 0.721** 
 (0.311) (0.316) 
Part II -0.048 -0.246*** 
 (0.139) (0.017) 
Part II × Exclusive (Charity) -0.491** 0.185 
(0.249) (0.257) 
Part II × Experienced (Charity) 0.832*** 1.609***  
(0.309) (0.334) 
Period   0.016  
 (0.010) 
Period × Exclusive  -0.057*** 
 (0.014) 
Period × Experienced  -0.063*** 
  (0.014) 
Constant 0.241 0.173  
(0.264) (0.270) 
Observations 5,619 5,619 
Number of subjects 240 240 
Test: Exclusive = Part II × Experienced p = 0.09 p = 0.45 
 
Notes: The dependent variable in all models takes on value 1 if a buyer purchased a fair product 
and 0 if the buyer purchased a harmful product. We omit the cases in which the consumer purchased 
no product. Baseline and Part I serve as omitted categories. Exclusive (Charity) and Experienced 
(Charity) are binary variables taking on value 1 in the corresponding condition and 0 otherwise. 
Part II is a binary variable taking on value 1 for data from period 9 to 24 and 0 otherwise. Period 
takes on integer values between 1 and 24. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the 
market level. The final row reports the p-value from a Wald test of the equality of the two 




Table C.2: Regressions of social appropriateness 
 OLS Ordered Probit 
Exclusive (Charity) -0.292*** -0.686*** 
 (0.102) (0.235) 
Experienced (Charity) -0.394*** -0.914*** 
 (0.081) (0.190) 
Constant -0.136** - 
 (0.055)  
Observations 528 528 
Notes. The dependent variable in all models take values from -1 to 1 corresponding to the 
numerical scores previously described. Baseline serves as omitted category. All standard errors 




D. Content Analysis for Study 1 
Table D.1: Different coding categories and their description 
Category Description 
Recommending no 
impact on Cs 
Any statement supporting the exchange of the “products with no 
effect on Participant C”, or the boycott of the “products with a loss 
for Participant C,” irrespective of whether or not a reason is given. 
Note that the statements can be explicit or implicit. 
Recommending 
impact on Cs 
Any statement supporting the exchange of the “products with a loss 
for Participant C,” irrespective of whether or not a reason is given. 
Note that the statements can be explicit or implicit. 
Discussion of 
prices 
Any statement mentioning or discussing the prices of the products 
exchanged. 
Fairness Any statement supporting an argument by appealing to fairness, the 
“right thing to do” or morality, or demonstrating empathy for 
Participants C. 
Efficiency Any statement supporting an argument by appealing to efficiency 
(maximizing the total earnings of everybody), sustainability, or 
comparing the cost of having no impact on Participants C with the 
loss incurred by Participants C. 
Self-interest Any statement supporting an argument by appealing to selfishness, 
maximization of own profit or earnings. 
Agreement Any statement agreeing with or supporting a previous argument. 
Questions about 
what to do in the 
market game 
Any statement questioning what participants should do in the 
market game, in the form of a question or not. 
General discussion 
of the game or the 
experiment 
Any statement that mentions or discusses the market game or the 
experiment without clearly prescribing, supporting or justifying any 
particular behavior. 
No category / 
Unclear 
Any statement that does not fit in any category or for which the 
meaning is unclear. Use this category for any messages that you 
cannot otherwise categorize. You should not use this category if you 
also assign another category to a message. 
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Table D.2: Fraction of messages assigned to each category 
 
 Veil No Veil Exclusive 
 Switz. China Switz. China Switz. China 
No impact on Cs 0.13 0.06 0.22 0.06 0.15 0.02 
Impact on Cs 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Prices 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.13 0.04 
Fairness 0.11 0.06 0.18 0.07 0.16 0.03 
Efficiency 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.01 
Self-interest 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Agreement 0.19 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.18 0.04 
Questions 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.05 
General discussion 0.15 0.22 0.14 0.22 0.20 0.23 
No category 0.27 0.25 0.18 0.22 0.10 0.27 
Notes. The table reports coding where at least three of the four coders agreed. Coders could 
assign a message to several categories. 
 
 
Table D.3: Fraction of markets in which at least one message belongs to a category 
 
 Veil No Veil Exclusive 
 Switz. China Switz. China Switz. China 
No impact on Cs 1 1 1 1 1 0.875 
Impact on Cs 0.500 0.625 0.375 0.500 0.625 1 
Prices 1 1 0.875 0.750 1 0.875 
Fairness 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Efficiency 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 1 0.625 
Self-interest 1 1 0.750 1 1 0.875 
Agreement 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Questions 0.875 0.875 1 1 1 1 
General discussion 1 1 1 1 1 1 
No category 1 1 1 1 0.750 1 
Notes. The table reports coding where at least three of the four coders agreed. Coders could assign 




Table D.4: OLS regressions of the proportion of fair products bought on whether or 
not a consumer sent at least one message belonging to the corresponding category in 
Switzerland 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
No impact on Cs 0.048     
 (0.033)     
Impact on Cs  -0.041    
  (0.066)    
Fairness   0.068*   
   (0.037)   
Efficiency    0.049  
    (0.036)  
Self-interest     -0.096 
     (0.068) 
Constant 0.882*** 0.914*** 0.873*** 0.903*** 0.922*** 
 (0.023) (0.018) (0.030) (0.020) (0.016) 
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 
R-squared 0.017 0.003 0.034 0.010 0.029 
Notes. The dependent variable in all models is the proportion of fair products bought over the 
total products bought during the 24 periods; we omit the cases in which the consumer purchased 
no product. The data concerns the treatments Veil, No Veil and Exclusive. All standard errors 
(in parentheses) are clustered at the market level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table D.5: OLS regressions of the proportion of fair products bought on whether or 
not a consumer sent at least one message belonging to the corresponding category in 
China 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
No impact on Cs 0.179***     
 (0.063)     
Impact on Cs  -0.130*    
  (0.071)    
Fairness   0.207***   
   (0.052)   
Efficiency    0.219***  
    (0.091)  
Self-interest     -0.141* 
     (0.076) 
Constant 0.440*** 0.509*** 0.418*** 0.468*** 0.522*** 
 (0.044) (0.041) (0.045) (0.040) (0.043) 
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 
R-squared 0.066 0.017 0.098 0.049 0.032 
Notes. The dependent variable in all models is the proportion of fair products bought over the 
total products bought during the 24 periods; we omit the cases in which the consumer purchased 
no product. The data concerns the treatments Veil, No Veil and Exclusive. All standard errors 
(in parentheses) are clustered at the market level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 13 
Table D.6: OLS regressions of the proportion of fair products bought on the 
proportion of other participants who sent at least one message belonging to the 
corresponding category in Switzerland 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
No impact on Cs -0.090     
 (0.081)     
Impact on Cs  0.008    
  (0.151)    
Fairness   -0.006   
   (0.080)   
Efficiency    0.018  
    (0.066)  
Self-interest     0.089 
     (0.180) 
Constant 0.972*** 0.910*** 0.914*** 0.907*** 0.900*** 
 (0.055) (0.022) (0.046) (0.026) (0.025) 
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 
R-squared 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
Notes. The dependent variable in all models is the proportion of fair products bought over the 
total products bought during the 24 periods; we omit the cases in which the consumer purchased 
no product. The data concerns the treatments Veil, No Veil and Exclusive. All standard errors 
(in parentheses) are clustered at the market level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table D.7: OLS regressions of the proportion of fair products bought on the 
proportion of other participants who sent at least one message belonging to the 
corresponding category in China 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
No impact on Cs 0.189     
 (0.155)     
Impact on Cs  -0.242    
  (0.268)    
Fairness   0.302   
   (0.186)   
Efficiency    -0.171  
    (0.394)  
Self-interest     -0.404* 
     (0.207) 
Constant 0.427*** 0.531*** 0.365*** 0.516*** 0.590*** 
 (0.077) (0.046) (0.085) (0.074) (0.070) 
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 
R-squared 0.014 0.014 0.029 0.003 0.046 
Notes. The dependent variable in all models is the proportion of fair products bought over the 
total products bought during the 24 periods; we omit the cases in which the consumer purchased 
no product. The data concerns the treatments Veil, No Veil and Exclusive. All standard errors 
(in parentheses) are clustered at the market level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table D.8: OLS regressions of the proportion of fair products offered on whether or 
not a seller sent at least one message belonging to the corresponding category in 
Switzerland 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
No impact on Cs 0.025     
 (0.031)     
Impact on Cs  -0.093    
  (0.065)    
Fairness   0.032   
   (0.034)   
Efficiency    0.045  
    (0.028)  
Self-interest     -0.162*** 
     (0.049) 
Constant 0.881*** 0.904*** 0.880*** 0.888*** 0.915*** 
 (0.027) (0.018) (0.028) (0.020) (0.016) 
Observations 144 144 144 144 144 
R-squared 0.004 0.018 0.008 0.009 0.077 
Notes. The dependent variable in all models is the proportion of fair products offered over the 
total products offered during the 24 periods. The data concerns the treatments Veil, No Veil and 
Exclusive. All standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level, *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table D.9: OLS regressions of the proportion of fair products offered on whether or 
not a seller sent at least one message belonging to the corresponding category in 
China 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
No impact on Cs 0.147**     
 (0.071)     
Impact on Cs  -0.069    
  (0.076)    
Fairness   0.190***   
   (0.049)   
Efficiency    -0.073  
    (0.083)  
Self-interest     -0.089 
     (0.073) 
Constant 0.431*** 0.485*** 0.400*** 0.485*** 0.493*** 
 (0.053) (0.039) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) 
Observations 144 144 144 144 144 
R-squared 0.044 0.005 0.083 0.005 0.011 
Notes. The dependent variable in all models is the proportion of fair products offered over the 
total products offered during the 24 periods. The data concerns the treatments Veil, No Veil and 
Exclusive. All standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level, *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table D.10: OLS regressions of the proportion of fair products offered on the 
proportion of other participants who sent at least one message belonging to the 
corresponding category in Switzerland 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
No impact on Cs -0.104     
 (0.091)     
Impact on Cs  0.056    
  (0.175)    
Fairness   -0.007   
   (0.077)   
Efficiency    0.009  
    (0.062)  
Self-interest     0.000 
     (0.210) 
Constant 0.967*** 0.892*** 0.901*** 0.895*** 0.897*** 
 (0.061) (0.023) (0.045) (0.025) (0.026) 
Observations 144 144 144 144 144 
R-squared 0.015 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes. The dependent variable in all models is the proportion of fair products offered over the 
total products offered during the 24 periods. The data concerns the treatments Veil, No Veil and 
Exclusive. All standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level, *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table D.11: OLS regressions of the proportion of fair products offered on the 
proportion of other participants who sent at least one message belonging to the 
corresponding category in Switzerland 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
No impact on Cs 0.213     
 (0.158)     
Impact on Cs  -0.329    
  (0.249)    
Fairness   0.322*   
   (0.183)   
Efficiency    -0.020  
    (0.357)  
Self-interest     -0.442** 
     (0.213) 
Constant 0.401*** 0.527*** 0.339*** 0.479*** 0.583*** 
 (0.077) (0.043) (0.088) (0.070) (0.070) 
Observations 144 144 144 144 144 
R-squared 0.016 0.026 0.032 0.000 0.055 
Notes. The dependent variable in all models is the proportion of fair products offered over the 
total products offered during the 24 periods. The data concerns the treatments Veil, No Veil and 
Exclusive. All standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level, *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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E. Content Analysis for Study 2 
Table E.1: Different coding categories and their description 
Category Description 
Recommending no 
impact on the 
donation 
Any statement supporting the exchange of the “products with no effect 
on the donation”, or the boycott of the “products with a reduction for 
the donation,” irrespective of whether or not a reason is given. Note that 
the statements can be explicit or implicit. 
Recommending 
impact on Cs 
Any statement supporting the exchange of the “products with a 
reduction for the donation,” irrespective of whether or not a reason is 
given. Note that the statements can be explicit or implicit. 
Discussion of 
prices 
Any statement mentioning or discussing the prices of the products 
exchanged. 
Fairness Any statement supporting an argument by appealing to fairness, the 
“right thing to do” or morality, or demonstrating some concern for the 
environment and/or poverty. 
Efficiency Any statement supporting an argument by appealing to efficiency 
(maximizing the total earnings of everybody), sustainability, or 
comparing the cost of having no impact on the donation with the loss 
incurred by the donation. 
Self-interest Any statement supporting an argument by appealing to selfishness, 
maximization of own profit or earnings. 
Agreement Any statement agreeing with or supporting a previous argument. 
Mentioning 
COTAP and/or its 
purposes 
Any statement that mentions or discusses the charity (COTAP) and/or 
its objective to fight climate change and poverty. It can be any statement 
that expresses support or aversion for the charity, irrespective of 
whether or not a reason is given. 
Referring to past 
behavior 
Any statement referring to past behavior to justify supporting either no 
impact or impact on the donation. 
Questions about 
what to do in the 
market game 
Any statement questioning what participants should do in the market 
game, in the form of a question or not. 
General discussion 
of the game or the 
experiment 
Any statement that mentions or discusses the market game or the 
experiment without clearly prescribing, supporting or justifying any 
particular behavior. 
No category / 
Unclear 
Any statement that does not fit in any category or for which the meaning 
is unclear. Use this category for any messages that you cannot 
otherwise categorize. You should not use this category if you also 
assign another category to a message. 
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No impact on the donation 0.17 0.17 
Impact on the donation 0.03 0.04 
Prices 0.15 0.20 
Fairness 0.09 0.11 
Efficiency 0.03 0.05 
Self-interest 0.02 0.02 
Agreement 0.20 0.19 
COTAP 0.01 0.02 
Past behavior 0.00 0.01 
Questions 0.09 0.06 
General discussion 0.10 0.08 
No category 0.19 0.19 
Notes. The table reports coding where at least three of the four coders agreed. 
Coders could assign a message to several categories. 
 
Table E.3: Fraction of markets in which at least one message belongs 







No impact on the donation 0.938 0.938 
Impact on the donation 0.750 0.688 
Prices 1 0.938 
Fairness 0.875 1 
Efficiency 0.875 0.938 
Self-interest 0.563 0.625 
Agreement 1 1 
COTAP 0.375 0.563 
Past behavior - 0.313 
Questions 1 1 
General discussion 1 0.938 
No category 0.813 0.878 
Notes. The table reports coding where at least three of the four coders agreed. 




Table E.4: OLS regressions of the proportion of fair products bought on whether or 
not a consumer sent at least one message belonging to the corresponding category 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
No impact on Cs 0.215***     
 (0.042)     
Impact on Cs  -0.294***    
  (0.062)    
Fairness   0.056   
   (0.057)   
Efficiency    0.079  
    (0.056)  
Self-interest     -0.245*** 
     (0.077) 
Constant 0.673*** 0.818*** 0.755*** 0.760*** 0.802*** 
 (0.042) (0.034) (0.046) (0.037) (0.036) 
Observations 160 160 160 160 160 
R-squared 0.110 0.105 0.007 0.009 0.057 
Notes. The dependent variable in all models is the proportion of fair products bought over the 
total products bought during the last 16 periods; we omit the cases in which the consumer 
purchased no product. The data concerns the treatments Discourse (Before) and Discourse 
(Intermediate). All standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level, *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table E.5: OLS regressions of the proportion of fair products bought on the 
proportion of other participants who sent at least one message belonging to the 
corresponding category 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
No impact on Cs 0.251***     
 (0.121)     
Impact on Cs  -0.904***    
  (0.168)    
Fairness   -0.052   
   (0.183)   
Efficiency    0.170  
    (0.211)  
Self-interest     -0.907** 
     (0.401) 
Constant 0.641*** 0.885*** 0.792*** 0.740*** 0.849*** 
 (0.078) (0.039) (0.070) (0.059) (0.042) 
Observations 160 160 160 160 160 
R-squared 0.044 0.131 0.001 0.007 0.067 
Notes. The dependent variable in all models is the proportion of fair products bought over the 
total products bought during the last 16 periods; we omit the cases in which the consumer 
purchased no product. The data concerns the treatments Discourse (Before) and Discourse 
(Intermediate). All standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the market level, *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 19 
Table E.6: OLS regressions of the proportion of fair products offered on whether or 
not a seller sent at least one message belonging to the corresponding category 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
No impact on Cs 0.185***     
 (0.061)     
Impact on Cs  -0.390***    
  (0.089)    
Fairness   0.069   
   (0.063)   
Efficiency    0.074  
    (0.059)  
Self-interest     -0.278** 
     (0.114) 
Constant 0.666*** 0.812*** 0.749*** 0.755*** 0.789*** 
 (0.054) (0.033) (0.043) (0.040) (0.035) 
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 
R-squared 0.070 0.119 0.009 0.008 0.038 
Notes. The dependent variable in all models is the proportion of fair products offered over the 
total products bought during the last 16 periods. The data concerns the treatments Discourse 
(Before) and Discourse (Intermediate). All standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the 
market level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table E.7: OLS regressions of the proportion of fair products bought on the 
proportion of other participants who sent at least one message belonging to the 
corresponding category 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
No impact on Cs 0.290***     
 (0.127)     
Impact on Cs  -0.855***    
  (0.163)    
Fairness   -0.011   
   (0.177)   
Efficiency    0.132  
    (0.203)  
Self-interest     -0.865** 
     (0.398) 
Constant 0.621*** 0.880*** 0.775*** 0.745*** 0.847*** 
 (0.080) (0.040) (0.071) (0.056) (0.044) 
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 
R-squared 0.049 0.109 0.000 0.004 0.058 
Notes. The dependent variable in all models is the proportion of fair products offered over the 
total products bought during the last 16 periods. The data concerns the treatments Discourse 
(Before) and Discourse (Intermediate). All standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the 
market level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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F. Instructions for Study 1 
F.1 Market Game 
We are pleased to welcome you to this economic study. If you read the following instructions 
carefully, you can – depending on your decisions and/or those of the other participants – earn 
money in addition to the 15 Swiss francs that you receive as an initial endowment for 
participating. It is thus very important that you read the instructions carefully. If you have any 
questions, please contact us.  
Communication with the other participants is strictly forbidden during the study. Violation of this 
rule will lead to exclusion from the study and loss of all of the associated payments. 
During the study, we will not speak of francs, but of points. Your entire income will thus first be 
calculated in points. The points you earn during the study will be converted to Swiss francs at the 
end of the study. The following conversion rate applies: 10 points = CHF 2.50. 
At the end of today’s study, you will receive the number of points earned during the study plus the 
initial endowment of 15 Swiss francs for appearing in cash. We will explain the exact procedure 
of the study on the next pages. For the sake of simplicity, we will always use male forms for 
participants; the instructions also obviously refer to female participants. 
The study 
There are three types of participants in this study: participants A, B, and C. The participants in 
this study are divided into groups of 16 people. There are 6 participants A, 5 participants B, and 
5 participants C in each group.  
Participants A are sellers, participants B are buyers. Participants C can neither sell nor buy, but 
they can incur losses due to the transactions between the participants A and B. 
The study last for 24 periods. In each period, each participant A makes exactly one sales offer for 
a product. Participant A thereby determines the type of product and the price for the product. 
• There are two types of products: 
1. “Products with no effect on participant C” and 
2. “Products with a loss for participant C”. 
• Every value from 0 up to and including 50 can be selected as a price. 
The production costs for participants A for a “product with no effect on participant C” amount to 
10 points. Participant A bears no costs (0 points) for the production of a “product with a loss for 
participant C”.  
The value of a product for a participant B is always 50 points, regardless of what type of product 
it is. 
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The five participants B see the sales offers made by the six participants A (the price and the type 
of product) and can accept one offer each. The participants B can decide one after the other in a 
random order. Each participant B can only accept one offer. This means that a maximum of five 
of the six participants A can sell a product. 
In each period, each of the five participants B will be randomly assigned to one of the five 
participants C. If a participant B purchases a “product with a loss for participant C”, the assigned 
participant C incurs a loss of 60 points. If a participant B purchases a “product with no effect on 
participant C” or no product at all, the assigned participant C incurs no loss. 
You will see whether you are participant A, B, or C on your screen at the beginning of the study. 
Your role as participant A, B, or C remains the same during the entire study. 
In each period, each participant A, B, and C first receives an endowment of 100 points. The 
payment in points of participant A (seller), participant B (buyer), and participant C in a period 
are thus determined as follows: 
Participant A’s payment 
• If a participant B accepts his sales offer: 100 – production cost + price of the product  
where the production cost amounting to 10 points are incurred only with a “product without 
effect on participant C”. The production costs for a “product with a loss for participant C 
amount to 0. 
• If no participant B accepts his sales offer: 100 
 
Participant B’s payment: 
• If participant B accepts a sales offer: 100 + 50 – price of the product  
• If participant B does not accept a sales offer: 100 
 
Participant C’s payment: 
• If the randomly assigned participant B chooses a “Product with loss for participant C:” 100 
- 60 = 40 
• If the randomly assigned participant B chooses a “Product without effect on participant C” 
or does not purchase a product: 100 
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Procedures on the computer: 
In each period, participants A enter their sales offers on the following screen: 
 
Participant A must indicate whether he wants to offer a “product without effect on participant C” 
or a “product with a loss for participant C.” to do this, the corresponding type of product must be 
clicked on. 
Furthermore, participant A must indicate the price he wants to request for the product. The 
corresponding number must be entered in the box. All integers from 0 up to and including 50 are 
possible. 
Once a participant A has made his decisions, he must click on the OK button at the lower right-
hand side. The type of product and the price can be changed until the OK button is clicked. 
Once all six participants A have made their sales offers, the participants A will see the sales offers 




The participant’s own sales offer is always marked in blue. Participants A can always see in the 
column on the right whether and in which order the participants B accept the offers. 
Once all participants B have made their decisions, each participant A will learn of his own 
payment. If his offer is accepted, participant A will also learn participant B’s payment and the 
payment of the corresponding participant C. 
This is where the participants A 
see the type of product for 
every sales offer 
This is where the participants A 
see the price of the product for 
every sales offer 
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The participants B can see the sales offers on the screen below in each period:  
 
Participants B see the screen above in a random order and can accept an offer one after the other. 
Thus only one participant B sees the screen above at any one point in time. Only when the current 
participant B has made his decisions will the next participant B see the screen above, where he 
can then accept an offer. 
The participant B who is first shown the screen can select from all offers. The participant B who 
is shown the screen second can only choose from the remaining offers, as each offer can only be 
accepted by one participant B. 
If the five participants B have each accepted an offer, one offer will always remain that can no 
longer be accepted. The participant A who made this offer cannot conclude a sale in this period. 
The order in which the five participants B decide on accepting the six offers will be randomly 
determined anew in each period. 
The prices appear in the left column of the table, and the type of product appears in the right 
column. Each offer is always in a separate row. In order to accept an offer, the corresponding row 
must be clicked on with the mouse. The marked row will then appear with a blue background.  
In order to accept the offer marked in blue, you must click on the ACCEPT button. 
The choice of offer can be changed until the ACCEPT button is clicked on. 
If a participant B does not want to accept an offer, he must click on the DO NOT ACCEPT AN 
OFFER button. Even if a row had already been marked, all offers will be declined if the DO NOT 
ACCEPT AN OFFER is clicked on. 
When all participants B have made their decisions, each participant B will learn of his own 
payment and that of his assigned participant C. 
This is where the participants B 
see the type of product for 
every sales offer 
This is where the participants B 
see the price of the product for 
every sales offer 
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Participants C cannot make any decisions during this study. We ask the participants C, however, 
to indicate in each period their expectations about the behaviors of participants A and B. 
When all participants A and B have made their decisions, the participants C will learn of their 
own earnings, which are entirely dependent on the decisions of participants A and B. 
After all participants have been informed about their payments in a period, the next period will 
begin.  
Your earnings in this study are the payment out of one randomly selected period. 
Because you do not know which period the computer will randomly select, you must consider your 
decisions in each of the 24 periods very carefully. 
At the end of the study, the corresponding point amount will be converted to Swiss francs and paid 
in cash to you together with the initial endowment. 
Do you have any further questions? If yes, please raise your hand. We will come to you at your 
workplace. Otherwise, we ask you to answer the control questions on the next pages. 
 
Control questions 
1. Assume that participant A offers a “product without effect on participant C” at the price of 
40 and participant B accepts the offer.  
How high are the payments to participants A and B and the corresponding participant C? 
2. Assume that participant A offers a “product with a loss for participant C” at the price of 40 
and participant B accepts the offer. 
How high are the payments to participants A and B and the corresponding participant C? 
3. Assume that participant A offers a “product without effect on participant C” at the price of 
15 and participant B accepts the offer. 
How high are the payments to participants A and B and the corresponding participant C? 
4. Assume that participant A offers a “product with a loss for participant C” at the price of 15 
and no participant B accepts the offer. 
How high is the payment for participant A? How high is the payment for a participant B who 
does not accept an offer? How high is the payment for the corresponding participant C? 
Please raise your hand when you have completed the control questions. We will then come to you 
at your workplace. 
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F.2 Debate  
The instructions are shown on the screen after subjects read the instructions and but before they 
entered the market game. In the following, we provide the instructions are for condition No Veil. 
The instructions for conditions Veil and Exclusive are identical, except that the subjects are not 
informed about their role on Screen 1 (in Veil) or that participants A and B are informed that 
participants C will communicate separately (in Exclusive). 
Screen 1 
You are a participant A (seller) / participant B (buyer) / participant C for the entire duration of 
the study. 
Participants C only: We know that this role might be not satisfying! For scientific reasons it is 




Before we begin with the study, the 16 participants who will make up a group of 6 players As, 5 
player Bs and 5 player Cs will have the opportunity to communicate with each other through a 
discussion board. 
During this time, we ask you to discuss with the other participants how “socially acceptable” or 
“socially inacceptable” it is to trade the “product with a loss for participant C.” That is, as a 
buyer or seller, to what extent is trading this product consistent or inconsistent with what most 
people agree is the “appropriate,” “right” or “moral” thing to do? 
You have eight minutes to discuss with the other participants in your group. Please use this time 
to discuss this topic.  
Please click the "next"-button to get to the chat page. 
 
Screen 3 
Please enter your messages in the blue box at the bottom of the page. After typing in your message 
to the other participants, please press the “Enter” key to display your message. Each participant 
has been assigned a random number, which is displayed in front of the respective messages. This 
number is displayed along with the corresponding participant’s role (A, B, or C). You see your 
number when you enter your first message. This number is simply so that you can keep track of 
each other during the discussion. Afterward, you will not see or use these numbers. Please refrain 
from sending any messages that could personally identify you.  
You are a participant A/B/C. Participants A are sellers, Participants B are buyers. Participants C 
can incur losses due to the transactions between the participants A and B. 
 
Screen 4 
Thank you very much for taking part in the discussion.  
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F.3 Norm Elicitation  
Screen 1  
Thank you very much for taking part in the study. We now ask you to rate how “socially 
acceptable” or “socially inacceptable” it is to trade the “product with a loss for participant C.” 
That is, as a buyer or seller, to what extent is trading this product consistent or inconsistent with 
what most people agree is the “appropriate,” “right” or “moral” thing to do? You may choose 
from four possible responses: “highly socially acceptable,” “somewhat socially acceptable,” 
“somewhat socially inacceptable,” and “highly socially inacceptable.”  
The rating you provide affects how much money you earn today. Specifically, we are going to ask 
you to match your rating to those of the participants in your group with which you interacted in 
the main part of the study. Note that we do not ask you to provide the rating you believe to be 
“right” but the rating you believe will be the one most frequently chosen in your group. 
At the end of the study today, we will find out which response was selected by the most people in 
your group. If you give the same response as that most frequently given by the participants in your 
group, then you will receive an additional CHF 10 (on top of your earnings from the main part of 
the study). Otherwise you would receive no additional money. The amount you earn from both 
parts of the study will be paid to you, in cash, at the conclusion of the study.  
For instance, suppose that you respond “highly socially inacceptable,” then you would receive an 
additional CHF 10 if the most common response in your group is also “highly socially 
inacceptable,” but you receive CHF 0 if the most common response is something else. Similarly, 
if you respond, for example, “somewhat socially acceptable,” then you would receive an 
additional CHF 10 if the most common response in your group is also “somewhat socially 
acceptable,” but you receive CHF 0 if the most common response is something else.  
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. 
Screen 2  
Below, please provide your rating of how socially acceptable or socially inacceptable it is to trade 
the “product with a loss for participant C.” You may provide your rating by placing a check mark 
in the corresponding box and then confirming this choice. 
Recall that you earn additional money if you give the same response as that most frequently 
selected by the other participants in the group. Specifically, if you match the most common answer 
in your group, then you will receive an additional CHF 10.  
What do you think is the most commonly selected answer? Trading the “product with a loss for 
participant C” is: Highly socially acceptable / Somewhat socially acceptable / Somewhat socially 
inacceptable / Highly socially inacceptable 
Screen 3 
The most common response in your group is that trading the product with a loss for participant C 
is: [result here]. Your response was that trading the product with a loss for participant C is: [choice 
here] Your rating did match the most frequently selected rating. Hence you earn an additional 10 
CHF. / Your rating did not match the most frequently selected rating. Hence you do not earn an 
additional 10 CHF.  
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G. Instructions for Study 2 
G.1 Market Game 
The study 
There are two types of participants in this study: Participants A and B. The participants are divided 
into groups of 11 people. There are six Participants A and five Participants B (buyers) in each 
group.  Participants A are sellers and Participants B are buyers. You will see whether you are 
Participant A or B on your screen at the beginning of the study. Your role as Participant A or B 
will remain the same during the entire study. 
For each participant B, a donation to the charity COTAP of potentially 100 points (25 CHF) will 
be made. The organization COTAP (Carbon Offsets To Alleviate Poverty) supports certified 
forestry projects in under-developed countries, which help reduce CO2 in the atmosphere and 
create life-changing income for the world’s poorest people. More details about COTAP’s mission 
are provided at the end of the instructions. The exact amount of the donation to COTAP depends 
on what type of product a seller (Participant A) and buyer (Participant B) trade. This will be 
explained in more detail below. 
The study last for 24 periods. In each period, each participant A makes exactly one sales offer for 
a product. Participant A thereby determines the type of product and the price for the product. 
• There are two types of products: 
1. “Products with no effect on the donation” and 
2. “Products with a reduction for the donation”. 
• Every value from 0 up to and including 50 can be selected as a price. 
Production cost: 
• The production costs for participants A for a “product with no effect on the donation” 
amount to 20 points. Participant A bears no costs (0 points) for the production of a 
“product with a reduction for the donation”.  
Value of the product: 
• The value of a product for a participant B is always 50 points, regardless of what type of 
product it is. 
Effect on the donation: 
• If a participant B purchases a “product with no effect on the donation” or no product at 
all, the donation will be not be reduced and will be of 100 points. 
• If a participant B purchases a “product with a reduction for the donation”, the donation 
will incur a reduction of 60 points to 40 points. 
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Market Activity 
The five participants B see the sales offers made by the six participants A (the price and the type 
of product) and can accept one offer each. The participants B can decide one after the other in a 
random order. Each participant B can only accept one offer. This means that a maximum of five 
of the six participants A can sell a product. 
 
Payment 
In each period, each Participant A and Participant B initially receives an endowment of 100 
points. The payments in points of Participant A (seller) and Participant B (buyer) in a period are 
then determined as follows: 
 
Participant A’s payment 
• If a participant B accepts his sales offer: 100 – production cost + price of the product  
where the production cost amounting to 20 points are incurred only with a “product without 
effect on the donation”. The production costs for a “product with a reduction for the 
donation” amount to 0. 
• If no participant B accepts his sales offer: 100 
 
Participant B’s payment: 
• If participant B accepts a sales offer: 100 + 50 – price of the product  
• If participant B does not accept a sales offer: 100 
 
Amount donated by Participant B: 
• If a participant B chooses a “Product with reduction for the donation:” 100 - 60  
• If a participant B chooses a “Product without effect on the donation” or does not purchase 
a product: 100 
 
More about COTAP: 
The mission of COTAP is to empower individuals and organizations in developed countries to 
address both climate change and global poverty. COTAP counteracts carbon emissions through 
certified forestry projects in under-developed regions, which create transparent, accountable, and 
life-changing earnings for rural farming communities where income levels are less than $2 per 
day.  
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COTAP sources carbon offset funds from those who care about both climate change and poverty 
alleviation, pools those funds, and transparently matches those funds with their partners’ forestry 
projects in order to fill the forestry carbon finance gap, restore landscapes, and create direct, 
significant, verifiable, and lasting benefits for the most economically vulnerable people in the 
world.  
Through COTAP, you are paying smallholder farmers in developing countries for planting and 
maintaining trees, which capture and store your CO2 emissions. A donation of 10 points (= CHF 
2.5) offsets 0.25 tons of carbon dioxide (CO2), or 250 Kg of CO2. 
 
Procedures on the computer: 
In each period, participants A enter their sales offers on the following screen: 
 
Participant A must indicate whether he wants to offer a “product without effect on the donation” 
or a “product with a reduction for the donation.” to do this, the corresponding type of product 
must be clicked on. 
Furthermore, participant A must indicate the price he wants to request for the product. The 
corresponding number must be entered in the box. All integers from 0 up to and including 50 are 
possible. 
Once a participant A has made his decisions, he must click on the OK button at the lower right-
hand side. The type of product and the price can be changed until the OK button is clicked. 
Once all six participants A have made their sales offers, the participants A will see the sales offers 
(the price and the type of product) of all of the other participants A in a table. Here is an example: 
 
 
The participant’s own sales offer is always marked in blue. Participants A can always see in the 
column on the right whether and in which order the participants B accept the offers. 
This is where the participants A 
see the type of product for 
every sales offer 
This is where the participants A 
see the price of the product for 
every sales offer 
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Once all participants B have made their decisions, each participant A will learn of his own 
payment. If his offer is accepted, participant A will also learn participant B’s payment and the 
corresponding amount donated. 
The participants B can see the sales offers on the screen below in each period:  
 
Participants B see the screen above in a random order and can accept an offer one after the other. 
Thus only one participant B sees the screen above at any one point in time. Only when the current 
participant B has made his decisions will the next participant B see the screen above, where he 
can then accept an offer. 
The participant B who is first shown the screen can select from all offers. The participant B who 
is shown the screen second can only choose from the remaining offers, as each offer can only be 
accepted by one participant B. 
If the five participants B have each accepted an offer, one offer will always remain that can no 
longer be accepted. The participant A who made this offer cannot conclude a sale in this period. 
The order in which the five participants B decide on accepting the six offers will be randomly 
determined anew in each period. 
The prices appear in the left column of the table, and the type of product appears in the right 
column. Each offer is always in a separate row. In order to accept an offer, the corresponding row 
must be clicked on with the mouse. The marked row will then appear with a blue background.  
In order to accept the offer marked in blue, you must click on the ACCEPT button. 
The choice of offer can be changed until the ACCEPT button is clicked on. 
If a participant B does not want to accept an offer, he must click on the DO NOT ACCEPT AN 
OFFER button. Even if a row had already been marked, all offers will be declined if the DO NOT 
ACCEPT AN OFFER is clicked on. 
When all participants B have made their decisions, each participant B will learn of his own 
payment and the corresponding amount donated. 
After all participants have been informed about their payments and the amount donated in a 
period, the next period will begin.   
This is where the participants B 
see the price of the product for 
every sales offer 
This is where the participants B 
see the type of product for 
every sales offer 
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Your earnings in this study are the payment out of one randomly selected period. This selected 
period will also determine the actual donation that is made to COTAP. 
Because you do not know which period the computer will randomly select, you must consider your 
decisions in each of the 24 periods very carefully. 
At the end of the study, the corresponding point amount will be converted to Swiss francs and paid 
in cash to you together with the initial endowment. 
We will also make the donation to COTAP. If you want to verify that COTAP actually received the 
money donated, you will be prompted to type in your e-mail address at the end of the study and we 
will send you a dated receipt indicating the donated amount. 
Do you have any further questions? If yes, please raise your hand. We will come to you at your 
workplace. Otherwise, we ask you to answer the control questions on the next pages. 
Control questions 
1. Assume that participant A offers a “product without effect on the donation” at the price of 40 
and participant B accepts the offer.  
How high are the payments to participants A and B and the corresponding amount donated? 
2. Assume that participant A offers a “product with a reduction for the donation” at the price of 
40 and participant B accepts the offer. 
How high are the payments to participants A and B and the corresponding amount donated? 
3. Assume that participant A offers a “product without effect on the donation” at the price of 25 
and participant B accepts the offer. 
How high are the payments to participants A and B and the corresponding amount donated? 
4. Assume that participant A offers a “product with a reduction for the donation” at the price of 
25 and no participant B accepts the offer. 
How high is the payment for participant A? How high is the payment for a participant B who 
does not accept an offer? How high is the corresponding amount donated? 
 
 
G.2 Debate  
Instructions correspond to the ones in Study 1, which the respective changes implemented. 
 
G.3 Norm Elicitation  
Instructions correspond to the ones in Study 1, which the respective changes implemented. 
